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ABSTRACT 
 
This is a comprehensive study about the emission trading system.  
The first chapter is about designing an optimal hybrid emission control system in a 
multiple compliance period setup. Previous studies have primarily focused on a hybrid policy 
of emission regulation that included an emission cap and permit price ceiling in a single period 
model, we extend this literature by developing such an optimal hybrid model in a multi-period 
framework where banking and borrowing of emission permits is allowed. In our model, we 
compare the case of a regulator who sets the emission cap and price ceiling to be consistent with 
a long run emission objective with the case of a regulator who occasionally is motivated to 
deviate from the optimal long run regulatory policy in order to correct for unexpected but 
exceptionally high emissions. Using a discrete dynamic programming model with stochastic 
emissions, we show that the hybrid model gives the regulator a degree of freedom in making an 
optimal price and quantity choice 
The second chapter is about linking the emission allowance market and the offset credit 
market. The Kyoto Protocol established targets for curbing greenhouse gas emissions in order to 
mitigate climate change, and it introduced two kinds of market-based mechanisms: the emission 
allowance market and the carbon offset market. We identify stylized features of the interaction 
between the two mechanisms. Our partial equilibrium model is the first analytic work that 
derives a closed form solution incorporating most policy instruments, such as abatement and 
offset usage, and delivery risks in offsets. The equilibrium solution enables to show an 
asymmetric price change of allowances and offsets in both directions and magnitude. We show 
how the price equilibrium and the price spread between allowances and offsets are affected by 
market conditions, such as the offset import limit, abatement and offset cost, penalty rate, 
emission cap, and base emissions.  
The third chapter is about the exchange rate effect on carbon credit price via energy 
markets. The main purpose of the paper is to examine the impact of currency exchange rates on 
the carbon market. We scrutinize this effect through the European Union Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU-ETS), which primarily uses two substitutable fossil energy inputs for the generation 
of electricity: coal and natural gas. The European coal market is directly driven by global coal 
markets that are denominated in USD, whereas, natural gas is mainly imported from Russia and 
is denominated in Euro. The impulse response functions of a Structural Vector Autoregression 
(SVAR) model demonstrates that a shock in the Euro/USD exchange rate can be transmitted 
through the channel of energy substitution between coal and natural gas, and therefore, produces 
influences on the carbon credit market. 
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Chapter 1: An Optimal Hybrid Emission Control System 
in a Multiple Compliance Period Model  
 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 
Cap-and-trade has been used in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-
ETS)
 
to control carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in order to prevent climate change, and it has 
been used in the United States (U.S.) to control sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) 
emissions under the Acid Rain Program as a part of the 1990 Clean Air Act. The combination of 
such an emission trading system with a cap on permit prices is referred to as an emission trading 
system with a safety valve. This hybrid system works like a pure emission trading system under 
conditions when the spot price moves under the ceiling, but once the price reaches the ceiling, 
the government provides an unlimited amount of permits at the ceiling price, effectively 
converting the policy to an emission tax. Therefore, in emission trading systems with a price cap, 
the environmental regulator has two policy parameters, the cap on emissions and the permit 
ceiling price. There has been a study about a price floor (Burtraw et al, 2010), but in our paper 
we focus on the emission trading schemes that has an only conventional safety valve. A hybrid 
system allows industries to avoid unexpectedly high compliance costs at the expense of 
introducing uncertainty in aggregate emissions. We study optimal policies in a safety valve 
system because safety valve provisions are often included in actual proposed emission trading 
legislation (the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (2007) and Low Carbon Economy Act 
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(2007) are two recent examples
1
), and the penalty for non-compliance functions as a cap on 
permit prices.
2
 In all major emission trading schemes such as EU-ETS, sulfur dioxide (SO2), 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) trading in United States, emissions beyond the emission cap were 
assessed automatic penalties at a fixed rate. 
Previous studies on optimal hybrid emission control systems are based on a single 
compliance period model (Jacoby and Ellerman, 2004; Pizer, 2002; Stranlund and Moffitt, 2011; 
Webster, Wing and Jakobovits, 2010; Grüll, and Taschini, 2011, Maeda, 2012; Fell et al, 2012). 
However, it is important to consider multiple compliance periods in this model because the 
regulator and regulated agents renew their decisions across multiple periods of time for two 
primary reasons. First, the environmental regulator may want to update the emission cap and 
price ceiling at given intervals in time as environmental or market conditions change. Second, 
emissions markets typically employ banking and borrowing (intertemporal permit transfer) 
provisions that allow regulated firms to bank unused permits from the current compliance period 
for future use, or allow regulated firms to borrow permits from future periods for current use.
3
 
Single-period models assume an exogenously fixed emission stock and level of banked permits. 
In reality, however, there exists a tension between long run and short run objectives of the 
regulator when the evolution of emission stocks is important in the environmental damage 
function. For example, a regulator may desire to pursue a policy that is fixed over time and that 
achieves an optimal level of emission stock and abatement in the long run, but he may also desire 
                                                 
1
 Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (S. 2191), and Low Carbon Economy Act (S. 1766) 
2
 An administrative action for non-compliance varies from warning notice, fine, or criminal prosecutions (Gray and 
Shimshack, 2011); but our paper considers a monetary fine as an enforcement instrument. Assuming firms would 
not purchase emission permits on the market at a higher price than the penalty they would pay if they simply fell 
into non-compliance.  
3
 Intertemporal permit transfers were banned in the first compliance period of EU market, but full banking and 
limited borrowing is used in the second period. 
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that emissions in any one period are not above a threshold that would send the climate beyond 
some tipping point. These issues are impossible to explore in a single period model.  
In this paper, we consider an optimal hybrid emission control system with multiple 
compliance periods that allows for the intertemporal transfer of emission permits. In doing so we 
extend the previous literature on the optimal regulation of emissions by bringing together two 
previously distinct lines of research; single-period safety valve models of emission control, and 
standard multiple period emission trading models of emission control that allow intertemporal 
permit transfer. We use an infinite horizon, discrete time, and stochastic framework in this effort, 
and calibrate the model to the carbon market in the European Union (EU). We demonstrate how 
long run and short run objectives of the regulator can be reconciled in this type of model.  
There is a large literature that has compared price versus quantity controls on emissions. 
Weitzman (1974) considered conditions under which one or the other instrument was preferred, 
and concluded that price is more efficient than quantity as an emission control instrument when 
marginal benefit of abatement is linear.
4
 Many subsequent studies have come to the same 
conclusion (Pizer, 1999; Hoel and Karp, 2001; Newell and Pizer, 2003). However, as Pizer 
(2002) notes, market-based quantity controls are often politically preferred to price controls 
because a generous initial emission cap can be negotiated and then tightened over time.  
An early model of placing price controls on emissions markets was developed by Roberts 
and Spence (1976). Their theoretical model adds an optimal penalty and subsidy as a price 
control to a quantity control, and they showed that this non-linear tax instrument (we call this a 
hybrid policy scheme in this paper) is always at least as efficient as the pure price or pure 
quantity control scheme. They concluded that that the more closely you match the tax function to 
                                                 
4
 This is especially true for the case of climate change because a stock of greenhouse gases does not change much in 
a relatively short compliance period. (Stranlund et al, 2011) 
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the damage function, the higher the resulting welfare, and a pure emission tax and a pure 
quantity control system are just special cases of a non-linear tax scheme. However, others refute 
the effectiveness of hybrid control, especially when the emission cap is not chosen jointly with 
an optimal price ceiling. Jacoby and Ellerman (2004), for example, demonstrate that adding a 
non-optimal safety valve can increase expected emissions beyond the emission cap. Alternatively, 
a safety valve reduces the expected permit price and thereby weakens the incentive for 
technological advancement in emission control.   
On the other hand, a number of recent studies design optimal hybrid systems that 
maximize welfare in a single period model by determining both a price and quantity instrument 
simultaneously. Pizer (2002) shows that a pure price control can outperform a pure quantity 
control in a general equilibrium model when compliance costs are uncertain. Given the political 
attractiveness of the quantity control, a hybrid policy can be a good compromise to the pure price 
policy because it may be politically feasible while offering large efficiency gains over the pure 
quantity control.  Webster, Wing, and Jakobovis (2010) show that an optimal price ceiling does 
not depend on the emission cap when there are constant marginal damages from emissions. 
Stranlund et al (2011), however, shows the optimal emission cap and price ceiling must be 
chosen jointly when the assumption of flat marginal damages is relaxed. Maeda (2012) adds to 
Stranlund et al.’s result showing that the relative effectiveness of the price verses quantity 
instrument changes as uncertainty in emissions varies: an emission cap is more effective when 
uncertainty in emissions is high while a price ceiling is more effective when uncertainty in 
emissions is low.  
All the hybrid models discussed above are based on a single compliance period model. 
Another stream of research has explored the efficiency of inter-temporal decisions within a pure 
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emission trading scheme. The concept of intertemporal permit transfer across multiple 
compliance periods was originally discussed by Rubin (1996). He finds that the intertemporal 
permits transfer provision allows emission trading to achieve compliance at minimum cost. 
Kling and Rubin (1997) state that intertemporal permit transfer can jointly minimize both the 
abatement costs of regulated agents and environmental damage costs from pollution. To make 
the intertemporal permit transfer system more efficient, Yates and Cronshaw (2001) and Leiby 
and Rubin (2001) suggest a policy that regulates the number of emission permits transferred 
across compliance periods. They show that choosing the discount rate on permits as a parameter 
of the model leads to lower social costs. Fell and Morgenstern (2010) are the first to incorporate 
intertemporal permit transfer into a hybrid emission policy scheme, and they conclude that the 
price ceiling significantly reduces compliance costs compared to pure quantity regulation. Their 
model takes the permit price ceiling and the emission cap as given rather than treating these 
policy variables as choice variables in the regulator’s problem. This assumption is innocuous 
when the emission stock is not near a region of significant non-linearity in the environmental 
damage function, as they note. However, significant non-linearity in the environmental damage 
function is likely to exist (Pindyck, 2007). Our paper contributes to the literature by presenting a 
multi-period hybrid emission control model that optimizes the choice of emission cap and permit 
price ceiling in each period based on a more general environmental damage function.    
The next section introduces our multiple-period hybrid emission control model and 
discusses the conditions for inducing socially optimal abatement levels by firms. Section 3 
discusses a regulator’s sometimes conflicting motivation to achieve both long run and short run 
emission goals, and this section discusses how these two conflicting objectives can be reconciled. 
The final section summarizes our findings and provides policy implications.  
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2. The Model 
 
In our model a representative firm possesses production technology that emits pollutants. 
This firm and an environmental regulator make decisions over an infinite horizon of discrete 
time intervals. The timing of actions in a given period is similar to Maeda (2012). The regulator 
knows the probability distribution over stochastic emissions to be realized, the abatement cost of 
the firm, the current stock of emissions, and the firm’s banked permits. With this information he 
optimally sets the permit price ceiling and emission cap that will be enforced. In each period, 
firms first decide abatement effort given the probability distribution of emissions, the permit 
price ceiling and emission cap, and their own banked permits. Second, emissions are realized, 
and third, the firm purchases emission permits at the ceiling price if emissions are greater than 
their allotment, or banks permits for future use if not. We assume that emissions are stochastic 
rather than a choice variable of the firm. The problems defined by stochastic abatement or 
stochastic emissions are isomorphic to one another; we chose stochastic emissions following 
Seifert et al. (2008). Uncertain emissions cause uncertainty in environmental damage, while 
uncertain abatement causes uncertainty in abatement cost. However, this assumption does not 
change our result since both uncertainties contribute to the emission stock in the same way. This 
setup is equivalent to assuming that firms do not modify their output decisions based on policies 
imposed by the environmental regulation. Rather, they first make profit maximizing output 
decisions and then make abatement and emission permit purchase decisions in order to come into 
compliance with regulations.
5
 
                                                 
5
 As an example, this might describe a coal fired electric plant who bases kilowatt hour electric output decisions on 
macroeconomic conditions and consumer demand, then installs scrubbers or purchases emission permits to come 
into compliance. 
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In the EU carbon market, a single compliance period is roughly 5~8 years.
6
 The regulator 
realistically can change policy only at the beginning of the each compliance period, and therefore 
we choose a discrete time model; this follows a similar temporal structure as Hoel and Karp 
(2002), Newell and Pizer (2003) and Carmona et al. (2010). We model the economy with a 
single representative firm because we want to focus primarily on optimal policy choices as a 
function of emission stocks or banked permits through time. This provides a parsimonious model 
with which to focus on inter-temporal analysis, rather than the allocation of emission permits 
across firms. In fact, Rubin (1996) showed that modeling a representative firm that effectively 
controls the entire regulated sector and operates to minimize costs leads to an equivalent 
outcome as modeling decentralized, heterogeneous firms.  
 
 
2.1. Regulator’s Problem 
 
The regulator’s payoff is the present discounted value of the expected stream of 
abatement costs,  (  ) , and environmental damage,  ( ) . The regulator chooses a desired 
abatement level,   , in each period to minimize the sum of abatement costs and environmental 
damage over time. The regulator’s objective and constraint functions are given in equations (1) 
and (2).  
(1)    
{  }
       
 [∑   ( (  )     (        ))
 
   ] 
This expected payoff is subject to the law of motion of the cumulative stock of emissions, 
(2)       (        ). 
                                                 
6
 http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/emissions/eu_ets/eu_ets.aspx 
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The parameter   is the discount factor on future welfare. The current stock of emissions is 
given by         , where    is the stock of emissions brought into the current period,     is 
the Business as Usual (BAU) emissions in the absence of emission regulation, and    is the 
current period’s abatement. The parameter   is a constant that translates the environmental 
damage from the current stock of emissions into a monetary value. The stock of emissions in 
t+1,     , is defined by the sum of emission stocks brought into the current period,   , plus net 
emissions in the current period,      . The parameter   is the rate at which the stock of 
emissions decays over time. 
Both the firm’s abatement cost,  (  ), and the planner’s damage function,  (        ), 
are increasing and convex (but not necessarily strictly convex) in abatement. Emissions are 
stochastic and distributed according to the probability density function  (  ), whose support is 
the interval [   ̅].   
 Given the objective function and law of motion in (1) and (2), the corresponding Bellman 
equation is 
(3)  ( )       { ( )     (     )    ( 
 )} 
Subject to  
(4)     (     )  
where the primes indicate the variable’s value in the next year. Following the method in 
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), we use the Benveniste-Scheinkman formula to solve the Bellman 
equation analytically. Abatement is the control variable, and the cumulative emission stock is the 
state variable.  
From the (3) and (4), the first order condition with respect to control variable   is 
(5)      [
  ( )
  
  
  (     )
  
   
  (  )
  
]  
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By differentiating with respect to the state variable,  
(6) 
  ( )
  
   [  
  (     )
  
   
  (  )
  
]   
By (5) + (6)  (since 
  (     )
  
   
  (     )
  
, and  
  (  )
  
   
  (  )
  
 ) 
(7) 
  ( )
  
  
  ( )
  
 
Equation (7) written one period head gives 
(8) 
  (  )
   
  
  (  )
   
 
After substituting (7) and (8) into (6), we derive the Euler equation of the regulator’s problem. 
(9) 
  ( )
  
  [ 
  (     )
  
   
  (  )
   
] 
Equation (9) represents the optimal decision rule for the regulator’s control  . Intuitively, it 
shows the tradeoff between emission abatement in the current verses the next compliance period 
from the perspective of the regulator. The marginal cost of abatement in the current period must 
be equal to the expected marginal environmental damage in the current period plus discounted 
expected future abatement cost.  
 
 
2.2. The Firm’s Problem 
 
The representative firm’s optimization problem with intertemporal permit transfer is 
defined by equations (10) and (11) below. Taking the emission cap, et, that is grandfather to the 
representative firm in a form of emission permits; the price ceiling, Pt; and their abatement cost 
function as given, the firm minimizes the discounted net present value of expected future 
abatement costs and permit expenditures. In equation (10), we assume the firm buys permits at 
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the price ceiling after exhausting previously banked permits. As Roberts and Spence (1976) 
perceives this price ceiling as a compliance penalty rate, we use the price ceiling as a penalty rate. 
Our model reflects the fact that firms would not intentionally violate the emission quantity limit 
unless they used up banked permits.              
(10)    
{  }
       
 [∑   ( (  )       [     (        )])
 
   ], 
subject to the law of motion of their banked permits, 
(11)       (           ). 
In equation (10) the first term,  (  ), is the regulated firm’s abatement cost function, and the 
second term,      [     (        )], is the firm’s potential payment for permit purchase 
at a price ceiling. Since    is emissions in period t,    is the emission cap,    is banked permits, 
and    is abatement, the term      [     (        )] represents the total expenditure for 
purchasing additional permits at the ceiling price of   . When the permit price reaches the cap, 
the firm can buy an unlimited amount from the regulator at the price ceiling,   . The discount 
factor on future welfare is   (for simplicity we assume this discount factor is the same as the 
regulator’s.) Equation (11) is the law of motion of banked permits,    , and the parameter  
regulates the rate at which intertemporal permit transfer is restricted (Leiby and Rubin, 2001). 
The number of permits banked for use in the next period,     , is equal to the current period’s 
banked permits, Bt, plus the current period’s excess permits, (        ). 
Given the objective function (10) and the law of motion (11), the corresponding Bellman 
equation can be written as 
(12)  ( )       { ( )      [    (     )]    (  )} 
(13)     (       ) 
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where the variable    denotes next period’s value of  . Before we use the dynamic programming 
technique, we replace the second term of equation (12) as follows to make it easy to differentiate, 
(14)     [    (     )]   ∫  
     
  
 ( )    ∫ {  (    
 
     
 )} ( )     ∫   ( )  
 
     
  (     )∫  ( )   
 
     
 
Thus, the new Bellman function is defined as 
(15)  ( )      [ ( )   {∫   ( )  
 
     
  (     )∫  ( )  
 
     
}  
   (  )] 
Fraas and Richardson (2010) argue the importance of consistency in environmental 
regulatory policy to maintain the integrity of permit markets. For example, they argue that the 
EPA operates under tension between environmental objectives and operational efficiency of the 
markets. This means a no-change (or slow-and-transparent-change) regulatory policy is desirable 
for operational efficiency, but the regulator sometimes would like to change regulatory policy in 
the face of new information about environmental damages. This tension is also evident in the 
EU-ETS; EU Directive 2009/29/EC, Article 9 specifies a constant (1.74%) annual emission cap 
reduction. However, the provision also explicitly states that the reduction factor shall be 
reviewed and possibly revised by the EU-ETS, who is not required to give any reason for the 
direction or the extent to which the cap is changed (Brunner, Flachsland and Marschinski, 2011). 
To incorporate these features of the regulated market we assume that the representative firm has 
a no-change expectation about future policies, that is,  (     )  (    ).  This is consistent with 
a regulator who desires an optimal level of abatement and emission stocks in the long run. That 
is, a regulator concerned with long run emission stocks will set P and e at a level that induces 
optimal abatement in the long run equilibrium. We take this type of regulatory objective as our 
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baseline case and we explore the possible tension between long run and short run objectives in 
section 3.  
We apply the Benveniste-Scheinkman formula to equation (15) in a similar manner as in 
the regulator’s problem to obtain the firm’s Euler equation, with the abatement,  , serving as the 
independent variable and banked permits, B, serving as the state variable.
7
 The first order 
condition with respect to the control variable   is given in equation (16). 
(16)   
  ( )
  
  { (     ) (     )   ∫  ( )  
 
     
 (    
 ) (     )}    
  (  )
   
   
  
 
  ( )
  
  ∫  ( )  
 
     
    
  (  )
   
 
By differentiating with respect to state the variable, B , we obtain 
(17) 
  ( )
  
  { (     ) (     )   ∫  ( )  
 
     
 (    
 ) (     )}     
  (  )
   
    ∫  ( )  
 
     
    
  (  )
   
. 
Then combining (16) and (17) we obtain 
(18) 
  ( )
  
  
  ( )
  
. 
Then expressing equation (18) one period head affords equation (19). 
(19) 
  (  )
   
   
  (  )
   
 
 
After substituting (18) and (19) into (17), we obtain the Euler equation of the representative firm 
in equation (20).  
(20) 
  ( )
  
   ∫  ( )      
  (  )
   
 
     
 
                                                 
7
 In stochastic dynamic programming, a stochastic variable usually appears as a state variable in the next period, not 
in the payoff function, which needs an expectation on the next period term. In the model of our paper, the stochastic 
variable   is in the current period’s payoff function, which means the actual emission   is unknown before 
abatement u is determined. Therefore, the variable u is decided based on an expectation about the variable y so that 
there is uncertainty in both current and next period’s payoff. 
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Equation (20) represents the optimal decision rule for the representative firm’s control  .  
Thus the firm chooses abatement efforts so that the marginal cost of abatement in the current 
period is equal to the expected compliance cost for the current period plus the discounted 
expected marginal cost of abatement in the next period.  
  
 
2.3. Model Specification and Calibration 
 
We assume that the abatement cost function, shown in equation (21), and the 
environmental damage function, shown in equation (22), have quadratic functional forms so that 
the marginal functions are linear in the explanatory variables, as is typical in previous studies 
(e.g., Adar and Griffin, 1976; Stavin 1996; Stranlund et al, 2011).  
(21)  (  )    
 
 
   
  
(22)  (        )  
 
 
(        )
  
Furthermore, stochastic emissions follow a uniform distribution from zero to  ̅; i.e.,     [  
 ̅]. Since we assume the regulator and representative firm are risk neutral, the qualitative results 
below do not change under a different probability distribution of stochastic emissions, and this 
specification allows for model tractability.   
From the regulator’s Euler equation (9), the closed form solution for the regulator’s 
optimal abatement is assumed to be a linear function of the emission stock in equation (23). And, 
from the representative firm’s Euler equation (20), the closed form solution for the firm’s 
optimal abatement is also assumed to be a linear function of the banked permits in equation (24).  
(23)   ( )   
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(24)   ( |   )   
 (   )    
 (   )  
Both optimal abatement solutions are described by equation (A-4) in Appendix A and by 
equation (B-3) in Appendix B, respectively. 
 We calibrate the model using the parameters contained in table 1.1 to represent the EU-
ETS as closely as possible within this framework. Emission stocks decay at a constant rate of   
= 0.7, which determines the half-life of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
8
 The upper limit on 
total emissions,  ̅ , is equal to 24 billion tons in each period so that   [  ] equals the estimates 
from the tenth report of Energy and Climate Change Committee in U.K. parliament (2012). The 
marginal abatement cost coefficient, c, and monetization parameter,  , are chosen so that the set 
of optimal policy pairs passes through the actual current EU-ETS permit price ceiling and 
emission cap (P = 70 euro, e = 6 billion tons).     
 
3. Optimal Policy 
 
In this section, we consider the case where the regulator determines the policy 
combination of the price ceiling and the emission cap, (   ), in such a way that the firm’s 
optimal choice of abatement,   ( |   ), is equal to the socially optimal level chosen by the 
regulator,   ( ). Notice that the presence of the safety valve introduces a degree of freedom in 
the solution to the planner’s problem. In a traditional emission trading model, the emission cap 
has been the only policy parameter available, and the optimal value of the emission cap sets 
marginal aggregate abatement costs equal to the marginal damage of aggregate emissions 
(Weitzman, 1974).  When the planner can also choose a permit price ceiling, the choice of (P, e) 
                                                 
8
 Moore and Braswell (1994) note that the half-life of carbon dioxide lies within the range of 19 to 92 years, which 
roughly consistent with our assumption of  = 0.7. 
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that leads the firm to make the socially optimal abatement choice is not unique.  That is, there 
may be multiple choices of (P, e) that results in equality of equation (25). 
(25)   ( )     ( |   ) 
 
3.1. Long Run Optimal Policy 
 
We define the long-run optimal policy as the one that keeps the policy stable across 
compliance periods. This long-run optimal policy induces the firm to choose the socially optimal 
abatement level in the long-run. The long-run equilibrium of this model can be found by solving 
the system of equations defined by (2)′, (11)′, (23)′ and (24)′, which assumes the average level of 
stochastic emissions  
(2)′             ̅   ( ̅   ̅     ) 
(11)′         ̅   ( ̅        ̅  ) 
(23)′          ̅̅ ̅   
    
  ̅ 
(24)′          ̅̅ ̅   
 (   )    
 (   ) ̅ 
Plug (23)′  into (2)′, then solve (2)′ for  ̅       
 ̅  
 (    )
(      
 )
  
Then, substitute  ̅  for  ̅ in (23)′.  Thus,    ̅̅ ̅  becomes the function of  ̅
  
   ̅̅ ̅   
    
 
 (    )
(      
 )
 
 
Plug (24)′  into (11)′, then solve (11)′ for  ̅ 
 ̅  
 (    (   )     )
(       
 )
  
Then, substitute  ̅  for  ̅ in (24)′.  Thus,    ̅̅ ̅  becomes the function of  ̅
  
  (   )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    
 (   )    
 (   )  
 (    (   )     )
(       
 (   ))
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Therefore, the solutions of long-run equilibrium are summarized as follows. 
(26) [ ̅  ̅   ̅̅ ̅   (   )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ] 
 [
 (    )
(      
 )
    
 (    (   )    )
(       
 
)
         
  (   
 )
(      
 )
   (   )    
 (   )  
 (    (   )    )
(       
 (   ))
]  
Then, a long run optimal choice of ( ̅  ̅) will equate the long run abatement function of 
the firm with the long run abatement function of the regulator.   
(25)′        ( ̅)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅     ( ̅| ̅  ̅)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
Equation (25)′ tells us that once the regulator determines the socially optimal long-run abatement 
function,   ( ̅)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,  there exist combinations of ( ̅  ̅) that equates   ( ̅  ̅)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  to   ( ̅)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . In fact, there 
is an entire locus of such optimal polices as shown in figure 1.1.  
Panel 1 of figure 1.1 shows the trade-off between the price ceiling and the emission cap 
when the long-run policy locus when the inter-temporal trading ratio, γ, is assumed to be 0.9. To 
maintain  optimal abatement, an increase in the emission cap must be met with a corresponding 
increase in the price ceiling. All the policy combinations along this locus result in a long-run 
equilibria defined by (2)′, (11)′, (23)′ and (24)′ and (25)′. The optimal policy locus is upward 
sloped and convex because if the regulator wishes to provide a lenient emission cap (large e) and 
retain optimal abatement levels, he must set the permit price ceiling high enough that the cost of 
purchasing permits at the ceiling price is sufficiently painful to the firm. Thus, the point featuring 
a relatively more lenient emission cap than other points embeds the possibility that emission 
permit prices could reach high levels, thus any policy pair along the curve incents the same 
amount of abatement. 
Panel 2 shows how γ affects the slope of the long-run policy locus. The series of optimal 
policy loci generated from different values of γ have a steeper slope as γ becomes closer to 1.  
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If γ is set to 1, there effectively is not a degree of freedom introduced by adding a safety 
valve on the price of permits. This means that the choice of the price ceiling does not influence 
optimal abatement decisions in the long run, and the long run equilibrium is the same as in a 
traditional emission trading scheme. But restricting γ < 1 retains the effectiveness of the price 
ceiling as a policy lever in conjunction with the emission cap.
 9
 
  
                                                 
9
 As Leiby and Rubin (2001) discussed, the inter-temporal trading ratio, γ, can be determined by other various 
environmental components. They derived the closed-form solution of γ that is a function of marginal stock damages 
and the decay rate of emissions in the atmosphere. Although we do not consider the functionality of γ by assuming it 
as a constant to simplify our argument, the numeric value of γ does not have to be 1 in our analysis, which provides 
a non-linear functionality between the price ceiling and emission cap in the long run. Therefore, in term of the 
regulator, the emission cap e is not the fixed parameter but there are multiple alternative policy choices of (P, e) for 
that results in equation (25) ′.   
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3.2. Short Run Policy Adjustment 
 
 This section discusses the case where the regulator may wish to temporarily deviate from 
the long-run optimal policy locus to choose an abatement policy that is short-run optimal. 
Occasionally there exists a tension between the long-run and short-run objectives of the regulator 
because the environmental damage function in our model is a convex function of the emission 
stock. If an exceptionally high or low emission shock could bring the climate near a tipping point, 
there is a need for thoughtful, temporary, discretionary policy adjustment in the short-run. This 
means that the regulator may be concerned with both the path of emissions as well as the total 
pollutant emitted over time. This is especially true with an environmental damage function that is 
convex; one bad year of emissions can be especially harmful, even if total emissions would 
remain under the cap for the planning horizon. In this section we discuss how the regulator could 
occasionally deviate from the stated long run optimal policy choice to mitigate a severe climate 
shock, or revert back to another long run optimal policy. Therefore, we can define the short-run 
optimal policy as a myopic policy adjustment that improves short-term social welfare 
temporarily at the expense of the long-run policy. This short-run policy is determined by the 
current state variables,    and    rather than the long-run equilibrium of state variable,  ̅ and  ̅.  
Panel 1 of figure 1.2 compares the long-run policy locus defined in section 4.1 by 
equation (25)′ and the short-run policy locus in any given period defined by equation (25). 
Similar to the long-run optimal policy, we can also see the trade-off between the emission cap 
and the price ceiling in the short-run optimal policy, but with a different slope. Points along the 
short-run optimal policy locus are defined by the amount of banked permits brought into the 
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current period, whereas points along the long-run optimal policy locus are defined by the amount 
of banked permits in the long-run equilibrium.  
Panel 2 of figure 1.2 illustrates how a temporary deviation from a long run equilibrium 
policy choice can return to long run equilibrium over time. Suppose the point    represents the 
long run equilibrium policy choice the regulator has implemented. Suppose further that in the 
current period there was an uncharacteristically large emission shock. If the regulator fears dire 
consequences from this large emission shock, he may wish to temporarily incent larger 
abatement than the point    would produce. We consider two example strategies the regulator 
could take to achieve this goal.  
Consider first the point   : the intersection between the long run and the short-run 
optimal policy locus. Since it is on both the long run and the short run optimal policy loci,    
achieves the desired increase in abatement consistent with the short run optimality condition, but 
also maintains incentives toward the long-run equilibrium abatement level. Unless there is 
another emission shock in the following period, there is no need for additional short-run 
abatement adjustments. The regulator can revert to the new long-run optimal abatement level by 
choosing policy   .  
Alternatively, the regulator could temporarily abandon the long run equilibrium objective 
and institute a temporary policy that imposes a strict cap, such as the point   . The regulator is 
indifferent between all policy candidates on the same short-run locus (e.g.    and   ) because 
they all induce the same level of abatement in the current period. On the other hand, regulated 
firms and industry stakeholders may prefer to negotiate for the temporary instatement of a point 
such as   , because of the mix between a strict cap and a low price ceiling. However, if    is 
chosen then the regulator and the regulated firm must agree to terms that transition the 
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operational policy back to the long run equilibrium locus. Otherwise, the regulator’s long run 
abatement goal does not coincide with the firm’s abatement. For example, the regulator could 
subsequently impose the point    in the next period to get back to the long run equilibrium 
abatement level or he may prefer a more gradual transition that imposes   in the next period. 
Once a policy on the optimal locus has been reinstated, it can remain in effect in perpetuity until 
there is another dangerously large emission shock. Ultimately the path back to the long run 
equilibrium locus can be chosen based on the regulator and industry stakeholders’ preference for 
policy stability and predictability.  
In sum, we have described a multi-period hybrid emission control model that helps the 
regulator to identify a long-run policy, such as    or   , that can both maintain policy stability 
and also offset a large emission shock. Since the long run policy can only be characterized with 
the multi-period model, it is required to make stable policy that occurs at the intersection 
between the long run and the short run optimal policy loci. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper developed an extension to previous models of hybrid emission price and 
quantity regulation by expanding the planning horizon to an infinite horizon discrete time model. 
This allowed us to explore several topics important to this literature. Permit banking and 
abatement efforts of the firm are capable of being treated as endogenous to one another, which is 
not possible in a single period model. Since banked permits are a substitute for abatement effort, 
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treating them as exogenous will over, or understate, the degree of abatement effort depending on 
the level of banking assumed in a single period model. 
Further, the hybrid model introduces a degree of freedom in the policy set by the 
regulator. We derived a locus of permit price and emission caps that all induce long run 
abatement that is optimal. This flexibility in policy may have important practical implications, 
since it has proven difficult to implement regulatory policy on climate outcomes. Being able to 
offer regulated firms a menu of policies from which to choose may aid in gaining industry buy-in 
and popular support for climate regulation.  
We highlighted the potential for tension between long-run and short-run objectives of the 
regulator. Both the regulator and the regulated firms desire policy consistency, but given recent 
research on climate change we recognize that occasionally there may be times when it is urgent 
to temporarily increase abatement above the level identified as long-run optimal. This could 
occur, for example, if an unexpectedly large shock in emissions brings the climate close to a 
tipping point. In this case we demonstrated how the regulator could temporarily deviate from the 
stated long-run optimal policy to implement a policy that meets short-run optimality conditions. 
Then the regulator can announce a path of transition back to the originally stated long-run 
optimal policy.  
Our treatment of the conditions under which the regulator needs to temporarily deviate 
from the stated long-run optimal policy is admittedly ad hoc. Future work could develop an 
environmental damage function that explicitly incorporates a climate tipping point (or other such 
factor that would give rise to strong short-run incentive to deviate from the stated policy). Such a 
model could inform how the short-run policy deviations are to be set, and it ideally would 
provide the probability that the regulator will deviate from the stated policy in any given period. 
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In this paper we have essentially assumed that the regulated firms believe there is a zero 
probability of policy deviation. Properly incorporating the tipping point in the environmental 
damage function would allow the price ceiling and emission cap to be state variables and would 
allow one to explicitly model firms’ expectations of the likelihood of a policy deviation. 
 
 
  
   
23 
 
Chapter 2: Linkage between the Emission Allowance Market  
and the Offset Credit Market in Partial Equilibrium 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The Kyoto Protocol established targets for curbing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 
order to mitigate climate change. In order to meet these targets, Annex 1 countries (developed 
countries) that ratified Kyoto Protocol need to reduce emissions and are obligated to keep GHG 
emissions under the domestic target level. The emission allowance market, so called cap-and-
trade scheme, has been used as an instrument for emission reduction and allows emission 
allowances to be generated from the emission cap and traded within regulated agents.  Also, as 
an important mechanism for compliance, the Kyoto Protocol allows Annex 1 countries in the 
emission allowance market to use alternative emission credits from the offset mechanism.
10
 
Although unregulated agents in Annex 1 countries or non-Annex 1 countries (developing 
countries) do not have to keep their emissions under the target, they can still reduce emissions 
voluntarily by financing emission reduction projects. These offset projects can generate offset 
credits that represent reduction of emissions. Offset credits can be traded and used by Annex 1 
countries in order to meet their emission reduction targets.  
                                                 
10
 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php 
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Several countries have launched national emission allowance markets or been running 
pilot markets: Australia, China, the European Union, Japan, Korea and New Zealand. The United 
States has been running regional GHG compliance markets such as AB 32 Cap-and-Trade
11
 and 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)
12
 and considered a national plan stated in Waxman-
Markey climate bill. With regard to the carbon market, most research has focused on the 
European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), which has the biggest market size and 
longest history in carbon trading. Under the EU ETS, the EU commission approves national 
emission caps for each regulated country (Annex 1). Each government then distributes a national 
permit allocation to regulated industries such as power plants, combustion plants and oil 
refineries. The allowances given by EU governments as part of the national permit allocation 
plan are known as European Union Allowances (EUA). The regulated agent can trade their 
allowances as needed in order to minimize emission compliance costs, and also purchase 
additional carbon offset credits instead of using domestically issued allowances up to a 
predetermined limit.
13
 
With regard to the carbon offset mechanism, it is usually categorized into 3 groups: 1) 
renewable energy, such as wind farms, biomass energy and hydroelectric dams, 2) energy 
efficiency improvements that induce emission abatement, and 3) reforestation and forest 
preservation activities.
14
 The Kyoto protocol defines some verifiable carbon offset activities that 
allow regulated agents to attain carbon credits from the projects as the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)
15
 and Joint Implementation (JI) administrated by United Nations (UN).
16 
The 
                                                 
11
 http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm Access date 07 February 2011. 
12
 http://www.rggi.org/home Access date 07 February 2011 
13
 http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm 
14
 http://cdmrulebook.org/152 
15
 The requirements for the issuance of CERs are typically complex, with CDM projects needing to undergo several 
stages before issuance, including national approval, validation, monitoring, and verification. Also, the timeline of 
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CDM and JI projects provide offset credits to those who financed the installation of 
environmentally friendly facilities and can sell offset credits to others. This creates flexibility for 
Annex-1 countries to comply with emission restrictions. In a similar manner with the emission 
allowances, carbon offset credit holders have the right to emit one ton of carbon dioxide (or 
equivalent amount of GHG) without it being counted towards their individual caps.  
CDM projects are hosted by non-Annex 1 countries that do not have binding GHG 
emission reduction targets.
17
 The project generates carbon offset credits, which are known as the 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). The objective of the CDM project is to stimulate 
investments in climate change mitigation projects to reduce emissions and transfer technologies 
from developed countries to host countries for the purpose of promoting the sustainable 
development of developing countries. On the other hand, JI projects are hosted in Annex I 
countries that are under the binding emission reduction targets. JI also generates carbon offset 
credits, which are known as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs).  
There are two types of offset credits –primary offsets and secondary offsets. The main 
difference between the two types is that the secondary credit has no delivery risks. A primary 
offset credit is contracted for forward delivery before the emission reductions associated with the 
project are approved by UN. (WorldBank, 2009). There is a great heterogeneity in these projects 
and they all face risk of non completion.  Therefore, the primary offset credit is not guaranteed to 
be delivered. However, once primary offset credits are sold to a brokerage company, they are 
called secondary credits and the brokerage company bears the delivery risk. For example, CDM 
                                                                                                                                                             
the project cycle varies according to the each project, but usually it takes up more than a year. CER issuance is 
approved by the United Nations Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board (CDM EB): http://cdm.unfccc.int/ 
16
 http://ji.unfccc.int/index.html 
17
 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
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Certified Emission Reductions are classified as primary CER (pCER) and secondary CER 
(sCER). 
Figure 2.1 shows the historical data for the EUA, sCER, and some examples of pCER 
from certain CDM projects during 2008-2009 in the EU market (WorldBank, 2009). Even 
though all three carbon credits allow holders to emit the same amount of GHG, both CERs 
typically trade at a discount to EUA. Two factors contribute to the persistent spread we explore 
in this paper: 1) sCER-pCER spread from the delivery risk of pCER. CDM project could default 
or fail before the effective delivery date, and it makes the pCER discounted compared to the 
sCER. 2) EUA-sCER spread from the quantity limit on offset credit usage for compliance, called 
import limit of offset credits. This is because sCER always trade at a discount compared to EUA 
even if sCER does not have any delivery risk and is assured to be delivered on time. The 
objective of the import limit is to prevent permit prices from becoming so low that the incentive 
to reduce emissions disappears. Otherwise, the importation of offset credits could make the EUA 
price collapse. 
The price spread between EUAs and primary and secondary CERs can be capitalized 
upon by firms in both annex 1 and non-annex one countries. For example, if a regulated firm in 
an annex 1 country has not imported its limit of secondary CERs it can achieve at least part of its 
compliance by purchasing secondary CERs on the open market. Since these always trade at a 
discount to EUAs, the spread represents a compliance cost savings to the firm. Further, if a firm 
in an annex 1 country is willing to bear the delivery risk associated with primary offsets, they can 
profit from the spread between primary CERs and EUAs by buying primary CERs and selling 
their allocated EUAs.  Therefore, compliance cost can be minimized swapping allowances for 
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offsets and bearing the associated risk. If firms are heterogenous in their risk preferences there is 
much potential gain from trading spread between these instruments.       
 
1.2 Research Question 
 
Our paper builds the equilibrium model between the allowance market and the offset 
market to develop a partial equilibrium between both markets.  The secondary offsets are simply 
special offset credits with zero delivery risk, so we consider a general emission allowance market 
with offset credits. From this point forward we use the generic terms allowances and offset 
credits rather than the specific terms EUA and CER. Further, the term offset credits refers to the 
more general primary offset credits discussed above. Results for secondary offset credits can be 
obtained by assuming zero delivery risk in the analysis below.    
There have been several empirical studies about the price spread between allowances and 
offset credits. Mansanet-Bataller et al (2011) find that the major drivers for the price spread are 
identical to the price drivers of the allowance: supply and demand factors of the allowance and 
the offset credit, such as energy prices and climate elements. Nazif (2013) states that the delivery 
risk in the offset credits is a strong explanatory variable in modeling the price spread (the 
secondary offset – the primary offset), while only determinant of price spread between the 
secondary offset and the allowance is the import limit on offset credits. Chevallier (2011 a,b) 
tests for correlation between the prices of allowances and secondary offset credits in a 
multivariate GARCH framework, and shows that the value of time-varying correlation between 
the allowance and the offset credit lies within the range of [0.01, 0.9]. World Bank (2009) states 
that risk-averse investors tend to buy guaranteed offset credits on the secondary market rather 
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than primary offsets, which determines the price spread between the primary and secondary 
credits. However, there are few analytic studies on the joint price formulation between the 
allowance market and the offset market. Carmona and Fehr (2011) initially propose an 
equilibrium model that investigates the joint price dynamics between the two markets. They 
derive the conceptual formula for the optimal equilibrium price and prove the existence and 
uniqueness of the solution. Barrieu and Fehr (2011) develop more tractable price equilibrium 
models than the model of Carmona and Fehr (2011), but without optimizing abatement strategy. 
Their reduced form model allows for a closed-form solution of price equilibriums to be obtained. 
However, neither showed how the change in different market conditions affects the price in 
allowance and offset credit differently. 
Our partial equilibrium model is the first analytic work that derives a closed form 
solution that incorporates most policy instruments and delivery risks in offsets. Our paper departs 
from the previous analytic equilibrium models by 1) optimizing the abatement strategy with 
purchasing offset credits but still deriving a closed-form solution of price equilibrium, 2) 
incorporating delivery risks of offset credits. We derive the comparative statics and perform 
sensitivity analysis by using the closed form solution, which enables us to show an asymmetric 
price change of allowances and offsets in both direction and magnitude. To derive a closed form 
solution of price equilibriums, we restrict our attention to the price interaction over a single 
compliance period so that banking and borrowing of emission credit over periods is not 
considered. Also, focusing on a single-compliance period enables to highlight the interaction 
between two markets.  
From our partial equilibrium model, we identify stylized characteristics of market 
interaction between the two markets. When supply or demand conditions change, our model 
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predicts the direction in which allowance prices move and the direction in which the price spread 
between allowances and offsets move.  There are many factors that affect the price equilibrium: 
abatement costs, offset credit import, penalty for incompliance, business cycles, amount of 
distributed allowances, and offset import limits. For example, our model shows that an increase 
in abatement or an increase in offset credits lowers offset credit prices. A higher penalty or 
higher emission probability raises offset credit prices. Furthermore, we find an asymmetry in the 
price responses of the allowance and offset markets even when both prices move in the same 
direction. We also show how policies designed to increase abatement can cause allowance prices 
and offset prices to move in opposite directions and therefore dampen the policy’s impact on 
abatement. Thus, our model helps policy makers and market participants to predict how each 
market and the allowance-offset price spread respond to market condition changes. .     
 The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we model two representative agents 
(uncapped and capped) and derive the market equilibrium and perform comparative statics. In 
section 3 we calibrate the model based on the parameters of European carbon market and in 
section 4 we conduct a sensitivity analysis. 
 
2. Model 
 
In this section, we derive the permit market equilibrium by introducing two 
representative agents. One represents an uncapped agent in a developing country (non-Annex 1) 
that is a producer of offset credits and an administrator of offset projects. This representative 
uncapped agent maximizes profits by selling offset credits to others, essentially abating 
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emissions on their behalf. The other is a capped agent in the EU (Annex 1), which acts as a 
consumer of both offset credits and emission allowances. This representative agent minimizes 
compliance costs by abating emissions and using emission allowances and offset credits. 
 
2.1. Uncapped Agent (non-Annex 1 countries) Problem 
 
An offset credit supplier, who finance offset projects, monetizes these projects by selling 
generated offset credits to capped agents who should comply with the emission regulation. That 
is, offset projects achieve emission reductions, which accordingly generates offset credits. An 
offset credit supplier gains revenues from selling offset credits at a market price,        . We 
assume the offset credit supplier is a price taker in this market. An offset credit supplier 
determines the number of offset credits, q, that maximizes their profit,  
(1)    
 
                       ( ) 
where the variable q refers to the amount of offset credits issued. We assume diseconomy of 
scale in offset projects so that        ( ) is a convex cost function of q. 
To maximize the profit of offset project suppliers, we take the derivative of equation (1) 
with respect to the control variable q.  
(2)                   ( ), 
so that the marginal benefit of selling offset credits,        , equals the marginal cost of offset 
projects,        ( )   
        ( )
  
.  
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2.2 Capped Agent (Annex 1 countries) Problem 
 
An agent under the emission cap can comply by 1) abating emissions, 2) buying 
allowances, and 3) importing offset credits from uncapped agents. The regulator restricts the 
usage of offset credits by imposing an import limit. The amount of offset credits purchased from 
uncapped agents is denoted by the variable,  . But the actual amount of usable offset credits, Q, 
may be different than the amount originally purchased because of delivery risks and the import 
limit. Equation (3) defines this relationship.  
(3)  (  |      )      [     ] 
As Cormier and Bellassen (2013) studied, not all offset credits are fully delivered as they 
promised in their project design contract due to country risk, financial risk, etc. The default 
factor,  , represents the uncertainty of delivery risks,   [   ]. The more risky an offset project 
is, the smaller the expected default factor would be, and delivered offsets equal   . 
Delivered offset credits can only be used up to an import limit defined by    [   ]. The upper 
limit of offset credit usage is a fraction of the original endowment of allowances, L. If the agent 
is not allowed to import offset credits (i.e.    ) the value of equation (3) is simply zero, 
meaning that only allowances can be used for compliance. Currently, the EU-ETS sets the import 
limit of offset credits such as CERs or EURs at    =13.4% of EUA allocation (Chevallier, 2011b; 
WorldBank, 2008, 2009).  
The capped agent minimizes total compliance costs. The total compliance cost in 
equation (4) consists of two parts: abatement costs and the expected penalty when the capped 
agent fails to comply with the regulation of emission. 
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(4)    
   
  {   (   )⏟ 
                 
  (   )⏟  
                                 
} 
Equation (4) has two control variables: emission abatement,  , and purchased offset credits, q. In 
reality, there are three ways to avoid a noncompliance penalty for the representative agent: 
buying allowances, buying offset credits, and abating emissions. Since our model contains a 
single representative agent in the capped agent, the net purchase of allowances is zero. We 
assume that allowances cannot be exported or imported outside its emission trading scheme.
18
    
The cost function for compliance is defined in equation (5) below.  
(5)  (   )        ( )            
We assume that the initial allocation of allowances, L, is given for free to the capped agent from 
the government.
19
 The compliance cost function,  (   ) , is defined by total abatement 
cost,    ( ), and the expenditure for importing offset credits from outside the emission trading 
scheme,          . The first term,    ( ), is a convex abatement cost function of the capped 
agent. The parameter         is the per unit price of offset credits which are delivered from the 
uncapped agent. 
The potential penalty for noncompliance to the emission regulation is defined in equation (6).  
(6)  (   )               [          ] 
where          is the penalty rate per ton of excessive GHG emission,   is uncertain emissions, 
and   is the abatement by the agent. Penalties could be levied if the capped agent emits more 
than the sum of allowances, abatement, and delivered offset credits. Although a certain amount 
                                                 
18
 Banking carbon credits for future usage or borrowing credits from a future compliance period is possible, which 
can change the total number of allowances in a certain compliance period. But we do not consider inter-temporal 
carbon credits transfer to focus on the price determination within a single compliance period. 
19
 During the phase 2 in EU-ETS, only 4% of allowances are auctioned off. (WorldBank, 2012) 
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of offset credits,  , is bought initially, only delivered offset credits in equation (3),   
   [     ], can actually be used for compliance.   
Substituting (5) and (6) into equation (3), the regulated agent’s objective is written as, 
(7)    
   
  {    ( )           ⏟   
                  
             [         [     ]      ]⏟          
                                 
} 
To minimize compliance costs of the capped agent, we take the derivatives of equation (7) with 
respect to the control variables, abatement u and offset credit purchase q.  
(8)    
    ( )
  
 
               [         [     ]     ]
  
    (  )    (  | ) 
(9)           
               [         [     ]     ]
  
            ( 
 | ) 
Equation (8) refers that the marginal abatement cost,   ( )   
    ( )
  
, should be equal to the 
marginal benefit of abatement from avoiding penalty, 
  ( | )    
              [         [     ]     ]
  
. Also, equation (9) refers that the marginal 
cost of buying offset credits (unit price of offset credit,        ) should be equal to the marginal 
benefit of using offset credits from avoiding penalty, 
  (  | )     
              [         [     ]     ]
  
 .  
 
2.3. Equilibrium and Comparative Statics 
 
By solving simultaneous equations (8) and (9), now we can derive the optimal set of abatement 
and offset credit usage (     ) from the first order conditions of both representative agents. Also, 
the marginal cost of offset project should be equal to the marginal benefit of offset credit usage 
under the competitive market condition. Using the fact that the equilibrium price should equal to 
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the marginal benefit of abatement and the marginal cost of credits, equation (10) and (11) show 
how the prices of allowances and offsets are defined.  
(10)               ( 
 )    (  | ) 
(11)           ( 
 )    (  | ) 
We derive the comparative statics of this equilibrium in Appendix C. The results reveal 
that    and   both increase with an increase in          and  . However,   
  decreases while    
increases with an increase in   and  .  
Changes in parameters Changes in equilibrium 
          ,       
           
   ,                  
 
Therefore, an increase in the penalty rate and emissions makes both    and    move in 
the same direction. This result reflects that higher non-compliance costs or higher probability of 
non-compliance make regulated agents desire more of both kinds of compliance instruments. An 
increase in allowances and import limit, in   and  , causes the relative cost to change between 
abatement and offsets. Increased   induces substitution offset credits for allowances and thereby 
reduces abatement, and increased   also decreases abatement. Additionally, increased 
allowances implicitly relax the import limit on offset credits because they are set as a proportion 
of allowances.  In the next section we calibrate the model in order to explore the magnitude of 
the comparative statics we derived in this section.   
 
3. Calibration 
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In order to calibrate the analytical results from the previous section, I assume each 
representative agent’s functional form and parameters. To derive the closed form solution of the 
optimal price equilibria, we need to assume a specific functional form of the cost for an offset 
project and emission abatement, and on the probability density function regarding uncertain 
emissions and delivery risks on offset credits.  
For the convex cost functions, we assume quadratic functional forms. The second term of 
equation (1), i.e. the cost of offset projects for the uncapped agent, can be defined as below 
(12)        ( )    
 
 
   
where the issuance of offset credits is q with a scaling parameter, k. Likewise, the abatement cost 
function for the capped agent, the first term of equation (4), is defined as below.  
(13)    ( )  
 
 
    
where   is scaling parameter, and u is the amount of abatement. 
Another issue for the model specification is the assumptions on the uncertainties: realized 
emissions, y, and default risk rate on offset credits,  . We assume that both uncertain variables 
follow a beta probability distribution functional family.
 20
 We choose the beta distribution 
because it is flexible enough to model the nature of uncertainty in this market in a reasonable 
way and at the same time we are able to derive a closed form solution. Uncertain emissions, y, 
represents baseline emissions. Baseline emissions are, by definition, hypothetical emissions that 
would occur without abatement effort (in a business-as-usual scenario), thus it is usually 
assumed to follow symmetric probability distribution such as normal distribution as Bushnell 
(2011) did. We choose the beta p.d.f. parameters that is symmetric about the expected value of 
                                                 
20
 Beta probability density function (α, β, ybar) =  
(      )            
    [  ]
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emissions,  ( )      (     ̅) , where  ̅  means the upper bound of uncertain baseline 
emissions.
21
. With regard to the default factor on offset credits,  , we assume that the probability 
of default is decreasing in the default factor; i.e., the highest probability occurs at  zero default, 
and the lowest probability is assigned to 100% default of offset credits. This follows the 
assumption of Huang (2007), which is approximated by a survey on the default risk of offset 
projects in China. Thus, for the p.d.f of the default factor on offset credits,  , we choose the beta 
p.d.f. parameters: i.e.  ( )      (     ).22 
Table 1 calibrates our model we assume parameters to replicate numeric values of the 
price of emission allowances in EU-ETS (EUA) and offset credits (CER). Thus the calibrated 
price trajectories of EUA and CER pass through the average value of price expectations for 
Phase 3 of EU-ETS (2013~2020), that is €19.23 per one unit of EUA (GHG Market Sentiment 
Survey 2012, IETA) with the current offset import limit of 13.4%. This parameter assumption 
will be relaxed in sensitivity analyses later. The penalty rate,         , is set at the penalty rate of 
the of EU-ETS. Then all other parameters are chosen so that the calibrated prices pass through 
the price expectation of EUA.  
In figure 2.2, we derived the equilibriums of abatement and offset credit usage in two 
different phases as the import limit   varies from 0 to 1. The dotted line that splits two phase 
represents the function,     , which is the threshold of two different optimal offset credit 
equilibria,   . This threshold is important because the expected amount of delivered offset 
credits follows the two different functional forms of equation (3) and the threshold represents the 
                                                 
21
 There has been much literature about the approximation of probability density functions using the beta 
distribution (Peizer and Pratt, 1968; Alfers and Dinges, 1984; Kerman, 2011). 
22
 See Appendix D to see the shapes of Beta distribution. 
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border between the two.
23
 The left hand side of the figure 2.2 represents the case where      
is operational in   {     }, whereas, the right hand side of the figure represents the case where 
     is operational in    {     }. The figure can be interpreted as follows: offset credit 
usage increases as the import limit increases until the limit exceeds the demand on offset credits 
(left hand side of figure 2.2 when     ), whereas, the equilibrium of offset credits stays the 
same when the import limit is no longer binding (right hand side of figure 2.2 when     ). 
Correspondingly, the optimal abatement    decreases as the import limit increases until the limit 
exceeds the demand on offset credits (left hand side of figure 2.2 when     ), whereas, the 
equilibrium of abatement stays the same when the import limit is no longer binding (right hand 
side of figure 2.2 when     ). Since    is also a function of the optimal offset,    , the 
threshold that defines equation (3) is also applied to derive    . 
From the optimal equilibrium of abatement,   , and the amount of offset credits,   in figure 2.2, 
we derived the optimal prices of allowances,           , and offset credits,        , in figure 2.3 
as defined in equation (10) and (11). 
Here, we define the spread as 
(14)                               ( 
 )     (  ) 
Here, the price equilibrium shows how two main factors, the import limit and the 
uncertainties in offset credits, can affect the spread between allowance and offset credit prices:   
First, regarding the offset credit import limit, policy makers can determine the import 
limitation,  , from 0% to 100% of the allowance endowment, and our model can show estimates 
on how carbon credit prices change in figure 2.3. The environmental regulator has an incentive 
                                                 
23         {     }    ∫   
  
 
 
 ( )   ∫   
 
  
 
 ( )                          when   
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)            when   
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to limit the usage of offset credits to keep carbon credit prices high, giving the capped agent 
incentives to abate their emissions.  On the other hand, if more offset credits are allowed to be 
used, the capped agent can use cheaper offset credits from outside the allowance market, so that 
the capped agent can achieve emission reduction targets more easily. For example, with a 
restrictive import limit, the allowance price would be high because of insufficient supply of 
offset credits; but the price of offset credits would be low because of lower demand from the 
capped agent. This produces a high price spread. On the contrary, with a generous import limit, 
the spread gets narrower. In figure 2.3, both prices do not converge anymore when the import 
limit is relaxed beyond about 60%. When the import limit is no longer binding a positive spread 
between the two persists because there is still delivery risk in offset credits. We define this kink 
in figure 2.3 the convergence threshold, which represents the point at which the import limit is 
no longer binding.  
Second, the degree of delivery risk affects the magnitude of this persistent spread. This 
permanent positive spread may vary by choosing different shapes of probability density function 
of risk on offset credits, even if p.d.f.s have the same expected value. This is because the definite 
integrals, ∫     ( )   
 
 
 and ∫     ( )   
 
 
  need not be the same even if ∫     ( )   
 
  
 
 ∫     ( )   
 
  
 for two pdf’s f1 and f2 and emissions, y. For example, in equation (6), we can 
see the objective functions become different when different assumptions of p.d.f. are assumed.  
Equation (15) is the expected functional form of equation (6), 
(15)  {            [            ]}           ∫ (       )   ( )   
 
   
 
and different  choices of f will cause the expectation in equation (15) different. Therefore, this 
will also impact the equilibrium spread in our model.  
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4.1. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Table 2.2 shows the sensitivity of prices and the convergence threshold to a change of 
plus and minus 10% in each parameter. Supply side parameters include abatement costs and 
offset credit supply; demand side parameters include noncompliance penalty and the emission 
cap. Note that the results show a marked asymmetry in the price responses; a large response in 
the price of allowances is coupled by a small response in the price of offset credits and vice versa.  
To support the numeric result in table 2.2, figure 2.4 illustrates the example of 
asymmetric changes in price trajectory when the parameters are perturbed. We illustrate only 
examples of positive perturbation in figure 2.4 since the responses of -10% and +10% 
perturbations are symmetric.  
In figure 2.4, solid lines refer to before the perturbation and dashed lines refer to after the 
perturbation. First, as seen in the 1
st
 panel figure 2.4, the increase in the abatement cost 
coefficient, c, moves the price of both credits in the same direction. In table 2.2, the sensitivity of 
           to 10% increase in abatement costs is bigger than that observed for        : a 4.8% 
increase in            verses a 0.56% increase in        , respectively  widens the price spread 
(                   ). An increase in c causes the capped agent to substitute offset credits for 
allowances, making the import limit more binding and raising the convergence threshold by 
2.61%. This is because expensive abatement induces the capped agent to use more credits, 
meaning the prices of allowances,           , and the price of substitutable offset credits,      
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would increase. Since abatement cost directly affects the allowance market and indirectly affects 
the offset credit market, we see the asymmetric response that contributes to a widening spread.  
The same effect holds true for the increase in the offset project cost in the 2
nd
 panel figure 
2.4, but impacts in opposite magnitude: a 0.05% increase in      and a 7.84% increase in         
in table 2.2, which narrows the price spread (                   ). So the increase in offset 
project costs makes the capped agent to substitute allowances for offset credits, which makes the 
import limit less binding: a 6.43% decrease in the convergence threshold. This is because 
expensive offset project will reduce the supply side of offset credit generation.  
The 3
rd
 panel figure 2.4 illustrates the effect of penalty rate increase. In table 2.2, the 
sensitivity of            to the change in the penalty rate is higher than         in simulation: a 
5.11% increase in            and a 0.77% increase in        , which widens the price spread. This 
relative price increase in            would induce more demand for offset credits, which causes 
more binding import limit: a 3.23% increase in the convergence threshold.  
Similar to the penalty effect, the 3
rd
 panel figure 2.4 can also illustrate the effect of 
increased probability of more emissions. Table 2.2 shows a steeper increase in            than 
       : a 12.52% increase in            and 1.85% increase in        , which widens the price 
spread. This yields a more binding import limit: a 12.65% increase in the convergence threshold.  
Also, as one of market intervention policy, the regulator can change the supply of allowances.  
The 4
th
 panel figure 2.4 illustrates the effect of injecting more allowance liquidities into the 
allowance market. Note that the change in the amount of grandfathered allowances makes both 
prices move in opposite directions. Table 2.2 shows a 10% increase in the supply of allowances 
lowers            by 12.01% but raises         by 6.37%, which narrows the price spread. Unlike 
the previous cases, we can see a significant decrease of the convergence threshold by 20.31% 
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meaning that the import limit becomes less binding. The reason is that the import limit is defined 
as the fraction of total allowances as seen in equation (2).  
 
4.2. Conceptual Analysis 
 
We provide a conceptual analysis of the allowance and emission markets to explain the 
persistent spread between allowance and offset prices in figure 2.5 and the asymmetric price 
responses in figure 6 observed in the previous section.  
Panel 1 in figure 2.5 depicts both delivery risks and an import limit in the offset market. 
In this figure the solid demand curves,  ( |  ) is the demand for offsets when there is no 
delivery risk and no import limit. Along with the demand for allowances given by  ( |  ), we 
see that this initial equilibrium (q1, u1) has allowances and offsets at the same price. The curve, 
  (   |  ), with the dotted line represents the offset credit demand curve when there are both 
delivery risks and an import limit. The possibility of default causes a pivot of the demand for 
offsets when the demand curve is multiplied by the expected default factor,  . The import limit 
causes the steep part of the offset demand curve and acts as a demand restriction. These two 
things together lower the equilibrium price of offset credits to the point corresponding to q2. A 
reduction in the use of offset credits causes the demand for the substitute, allowances, to increase. 
This is depicted in the rightmost graph of panel 1 as a shift out in  ( |  ). The allowance 
market must accommodate the excess demand produced by the wedge in the offset credit market. 
This increases the amount of abatement and the price of allowances (u1  u2). With the 
probability of default and the import limit imposed, the equilibria moves from (q1, u1) to (q2, u2).  
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Panel 2 shows the case where the import limit is relaxed enough so that it does not affect 
the price equilibrium. A lenient import limit increases the price of offset credits and quantity 
equilibrium (q2  q3). This increased offset credit usage shifts down to  ( |  ), which 
decreases the amount of abatement and the price of allowances (u2  u3). But still, we can see 
the spread from the new equilibrium (  ,   ) does not converge to zero as a permanent price 
spread between two substitutable credits because of underlying risks on offset credits.
  
 
Furthermore, figure 2.6 illustrates the comparative statics in (Section 2.3. and Appendix 
C) and sensitivity analysis (Section 4.1.). In particular, figure 2.6 can justify asymmetric price 
changes in both directions and magnitude shown in section 4.1.  
In the 1
st
 panel in figure 2.6, we illustrate the effect of an increase in marginal abatement 
cost. An increase in c shifts MAC(u) to the left and initially increases            (u1  u2) and 
lowers equilibrium abatement amount. Note that the amount of abatement, u, is the shifter of 
demand curve of offsets in equation (9). Then, decreased abatement shifts up the demand curves 
of offset market (  ( |  )    ( |  )), which increases         (q1  q2). Thus,            
rises significantly from the direct effect increase of abatement costs, whereas,         rises only 
marginally because of the indirect demand side effect. 
In the 2
nd
 panel, we illustrate the effect of an increase in marginal offset project cost. This 
increases       (q1  q2), but slightly lowers the amount of offset credits, q. Note that the amount 
of offsets, q, is the shifter of demand curve of allowances in equation (8). Then, decreased offset 
credits shift up a little bit the demand curves of allowance market(  ( |  )    ( |  )), 
which increases            (u1  u2). Thus,         rises significantly due to the direct effect 
increase of offset costs, whereas,           rises only marginally because of the indirect demand 
side effect. 
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The 3
rd
 panel explains the effect of an increase in the penalty rate,         . A high 
penalty rates raises the opportunity costs of noncompliance, which shifts the demand of both 
allowances and offset credits (u1  u2; q1  q2) to the right. However, this demand side effect is 
limited by the import limit in the offset market, whereas, this does not exist in the allowance 
market. The 3
rd
 panel also can explain the effect of increased emissions since an increase in 
emissions also increases both the demand curves for allowances and offsets (u1  u2; q1  q2). 
Again, the price increase in the offset credit market is limited by the import limit compared to the 
allowance market. 
In the 4
th
 panel, an increase in the supply of allowances initially decreases both allowance 
and offset credit prices (u1  u2; q1  q2). Note that the increased supply of allowances also 
increases the import limit. Therefore,         rises (q2 q3) when the import limit is binding. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 Our equilibrium model reflects stylized features of an emission allowance and the carbon 
offset market. Many countries have introduced a cap-and-trade scheme as part of regional, 
national, or multi-national plan for regulating greenhouse gas emissions and compliance with 
international commitments. Also, many kinds of carbon offset schemes have been developed to 
complement the allowance markets.  
 Our partial equilibrium model highlights asymmetric price movements between the 
emission allowance market and the carbon offset market. Because allowances and carbon offsets 
are substitutes, a direct change in a parameter of one market is always complemented by an 
indirect effect in the other market.  The market directly affected experiences a relatively large 
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price effect compared to the market indirectly affected, which has implications for the price 
spread between allowances and offset credits. Further, the indirect price effect can be 
counterintuitive in sign. For example, if the regulator decreases the supply of allowances this will 
naturally increase the price of allowances. However, ceteris paribas this will decrease the price of 
carbon offsets since the import limit is set as a proportion of the supply of allowances. We 
showed that a change in abatement costs, offset project costs, the compliance penalty, and 
emissions cause allowance and offset credit prices to move in the same direction while a change 
in the import limit and emission cap causes allowance and offset credit prices to move in 
opposite directions.   
 Our analyses give some intuition about the linkage between allowance and offset markets 
and their interaction with policy. For example, some have argued that there cannot be concurrent 
incentive for both investment in CDM projects in developing countries and cost reducing 
innovations in abatement technologies in Annex 1 countries. The argument is that if CDM 
projects are profitable, then there will be little incentive to invest in research to decrease 
abatement costs. Our results suggest that the effect would be minimal as long as the import limit 
of offset credits is binding. Although a decrease in abatement costs would decrease both 
allowance and offset prices, our model predicts that the brunt of the effect would be felt in the 
allowance market. That is, a decrease in abatement cost significantly reduces allowance prices 
but only minimally reduces offset prices, narrowing the spread and having a minimal impact on 
the profitability of offset credit projects in developing countries.  Therefore, our model predicts 
that innovation in abatement technologies will not have a large adverse effect on CDM projects.  
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Chapter 3: Exchange Rate Effect on Carbon Credit Price 
 via Energy Markets 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
   
This paper discusses the role of exchange rates on the carbon credit market. The 
relationship among the exchange rate, energy, and carbon markets has received little attention in 
academic papers and industrial reports. It is well understood that exchange rates impact global 
commodity prices (Akram, 2009). We posit that carbon credits have properties similar to 
physical commodities that make them behave similar to other commodity markets in response to 
fluctuating exchange rates. Carbon credits are standardized by construction: each credit permits 
the holder to emit 1 Metric ton of carbon dioxide (or equivalent amount of green house gas). 
Further, they can be stored for a duration of time. This paper shows how the carbon market 
reacts to exchange rate effects through its interaction with other energy markets.  
The exchange rate effect is important for policy makers to recognize. Although exchange 
rates are predominately market based around the globe, monetary policy does affect exchange 
rates. For example, a central bank sometimes injects liquidity into the economy to reduce the risk 
of bankruptcies and moratoriums in domestic industries, which can indirectly depreciate the 
country’s currency. In other example, central banks directly intervene in the market and 
manipulate exchange rates to keep export prices low or to smooth out its volatility.  
   
46 
 
 The European Union primarily uses two substitutable fossil energy inputs to generate 
electricity: coal and natural gas.
24
 Fuel-switching and its effect on the carbon emission allowance 
market have been discussed in numerous empirical studies. The power generation industry has 
been the main player in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) because it 
consumes around 60% of the total credit allocation, and electricity generators can substitute coal 
with natural gas relatively easily, depending on the relative prices of coal and natural gas and the 
demand for electricity (Delarue, Voorspools and D’haeseleer, 2007). Burning coal generates 
almost twice as much GHG emissions compared to natural gas in producing the same amount of 
energy. So, making GHG emissions more costly can influence the decision between fuels at the 
margin. Since the EU-ETS was introduced, power generators select the fuels they are going to 
use by considering the cost of using each fuel plus the cost of buying emission credits 
(McGuinness and Ellerman, 2008). It is therefore reasonable to assume that electricity producers 
decide their position in over-the-counter and emissions exchange markets by reacting to changes 
in the relative prices of the two competing fossil fuels (Alberola, Chevallier and Chèze, 2008). 
This fuel switching between different fuels with carbon intensities affects daily carbon prices 
(Koenig, 2011). Also, daily carbon prices affect the energy substitution of power generators 
(Bunn and Fezzi, 2007).  
The European coal market is directly driven by global coal markets that are denominated 
in USD; whereas, the natural gas market is denominated in Euros (Polański and Winkler, 2008; 
Timera Energy, 2011; Monthly Bulletin of BlueNext).  Also, we know from previous studies that 
the relative price between coal and natural gas affects the price of carbon credits because coal 
generates more GHG emissions than natural gas. Therefore, we can presume that asymmetric 
                                                 
24
 According to the EU energy report (2009), 29.4% of electricity was generated from coal, and 22.6% was 
generated from natural gas in 2007. (27.8% from nuclear, 15.6% from renewable, and 3.3% from oil)  
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exposure to exchange rate risk of the two energy inputs changes the Euro denominated price 
spread between coal and natural gas. Since exchange rate risk influences the relative prices of 
natural gas and coal, substitution between these clean and dirty inputs affects the price of carbon. 
For example, if the Euro depreciates against the USD, ceteris paribus, this increases the price of 
coal relative to the price of natural gas in Euros. This causes energy substitution away from coal 
and toward natural gas thereby lowering GHG emissions; hence, carbon credit prices would be 
expected to fall due to the reduced demand for emission credits. In this paper we describe this 
mechanism in detail and empirically test for evidence of the predicted effects between exchange 
rate, energy, and carbon markets. 
To date, most studies of the carbon market in the European Union (EU) discuss how 
supply and demand are affected by various factors such as temperature, emission cap policy, 
other energy markets, and market regulations (Chevallier, 2009). The studies of Chevallier (2009; 
2011 c.d.f) are the exceptions, and these consider macro factors like the bond market, the stock 
market, and business cycle indices to understand the EU carbon market using time-series models. 
Chevallier (2011,c) does not find significance in the effect of currency exchange rates on the 
carbon market. However, it is possible that the daily frequency in Chevallier’s (2011,c) data set 
are too short to accommodate the price transmission from a currency market to the carbon 
market through energy markets. Additionally, there were 115 variables in Chevallier’s factor 
augmented vector autoregression model, and the specific effect we wish to test for in this paper 
was likely confounded in such a large model. On the other hand, Frank and Garcia (2010) use 
average weekly currency exchange rates as indicators of commodity prices and they show that 
agricultural goods are becoming more dependent on exchange rates. Thus, we wish to identify 
the effect of exchange rates on the carbon credit price through the fuel switching process. 
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We use weekly data on coal, natural gas, Euro-USD and Euro-Swiss Franc exchange 
rates, and EU-ETS carbon credit prices to identify the effect of exchange rates in this market. 
Our conceptual framework shows how exchange rates can elicit a substitution and demand effect 
in carbon credit prices. When the clean and dirty inputs are purchased on the global market in 
different currencies, exchange rate dynamics can impact the relative prices of the clean and dirty 
inputs – thus affecting carbon credit prices through demand for emissions. In addition, a demand 
effect may be observed because exchange rate dynamics can influence a country’s exports. If the 
effect on exports is large enough, the change in emissions that results from increased or 
decreased economic activity will affect carbon prices.  We detect a statistically significant 
substitution effect on carbon prices due to exchange rates, but we could not definitively observe 
a demand effect.   
Also, this paper highlights the necessity of hedging exchange rate risks for major players 
in the carbon credit market. Rather than exposing themselves to the unexpected movement of 
value in currencies, investors can actively hedge this risk. Through hedging the currency risk, 
investors can avoid the foreign exchange market risk, and furthermore, they can take advantage 
of the movement of currency values and minimize costs of buying carbon credits needed for 
greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction compliance. To find out how much this hedging strategy is 
needed, we need to identify the mechanism among currencies, energies and carbon markets.  
We empirically illustrate this exchange rate effect on the European Union Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU-ETS), where the carbon market has the longest history and the largest trading 
volume among carbon credit markets. We detect that “un-hedged” position of carbon credits for 
regulated parties under the EU-ETS caused a loss of value up to US$ 887.1 million by a 1% 
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depreciation of Euro against USD in 2011 EU-ETS.
25
 We discover the effect of a currency 
exchange rate on carbon prices when substitutable energies are denominated in different 
currencies. A shock of exchange rates can potentially cause asymmetric impacts on the prices of 
substitutable energies when they are differently denominated in foreign currencies. Our analysis 
introduces exchange rates as a new price driver of the carbon market and show how the effect 
can be transmitted through the energy substitution. Our result shows that a 1% depreciated Euro 
against USD causes almost 36 billion value loss in EU carbon market (based on the 2010 market 
value).    
  
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
Relative energy prices are known to be the most important determinant of clean or dirty 
input use. (Alberola et al, 2008). In the European power generation industry, natural gas and coal 
are the dominant input choices – natural gas representing the clean input and coal representing 
the dirty input. Coal is denominated on the world market in USD and natural gas is denominated 
in Euros (Timera Energy, 2011) because natural gas is mostly delivered from Russia and Norway 
via pipeline, and the EU purchases it in Euros (EU energy annual report, 2008).
 26
 Therefore the 
relative price of these two inputs is subject to exchange rate risk. Further, it has been shown that 
the carbon credit prices are directly influenced by the relative prices of clean and dirty inputs.  
                                                 
25
 It is 0.6% value loss from the total market value of EUA: US$ 147,848 million (= weighted price in 2011 of EUA 
US$18.827/ton * 7,853 Metric ton of CO2) (Worldbank, 2012) 
26
 Or, natural gas of England is imported to EU continent also through pipeline; Pound sterling as England currency 
has shown similar exchange rate movement with Euro against dollar. In conclusion, we can think natural gas is 
less sensitive to exchange rate. Even if relatively small portion yet, LNG (liquid natural gas) which is asked to be 
paid as US dollar is getting increasing recently. 
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As a result, price of carbon should be affected by exchange rates through its effect on the relative 
price of clean and dirty inputs.  
In addition, Chevallie (2011 a,b,c) suggests economic activity also greatly influences 
carbon prices: an expanding economy increases carbon credit prices by an increased demand for 
emissions. Therefore, carbon prices are also a function of economic activity. Furthermore, 
economic activity is greatly influenced by international trade. A country with a weak currency 
relative to the currency of a trading partner  will have strong export demand for its goods; this 
stimulates an increase in domestic production (Rodrik, 2008; Hausmann, Pritchett, Rodrik, 2005), 
and consequently an increase in demand for carbon credits. Thus, carbon prices are a function of 
exchange rates through its effect on economic activity.  The two effects of exchange rates on 
carbon prices are reflected in equation (1), where we write the export demand,        ,   as a 
proxy for economic activity.       
(1)          (                (             )         (             )  | ). 
The symbol    refers to other unobservable price drivers of carbon credits. Here we define two 
ways that exchange rates can affect carbon prices: a substitution effect through relative energy 
prices, and a demand effect through international trade. In order to identify the effect of the 
exchange rate, we can separate both effects out by taking the total derivative of equation (1) with 
respect to exchange rates (equation 2). 
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In equation (3), we illustrate the effect of the Euro/USD.  
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When the Euro is depreciated (increased Euro/USD exchange rate) the price of coal in Euros 
increases, while the price of natural gas in Euros is unchanged. This causes end users to 
substitute coal for natural gas, and the resultant decrease in GHG emissions depresses carbon 
prices (negative substitution effect: Euro/USD ↑ → carbon price ↓). On the other hand, a 
depreciated Euro might increase exports, which raises carbon prices (positive demand effect: 
Euro/USD ↑ → carbon price ↑). This effect is illustrated in figure 3.1. As a consequence, the 
aggregate effect of an exchange rate on carbon prices is ambiguous when the dirty input is 
denominated in the foreign currency, as is the case with the USD and coal in the EU.  
We identify the substitution verses the demand effect by incorporating the 
Euro/SFr(Swiss Franc) exchange rate. The Euro/SFr only has a demand effect becuase energy 
prices in global markets are not denominated in SFr, and the EU does not import a significant 
amount of coal or natural gas from Switzerland. Thus, a change in the Euro/SFr exchange rate 
does not impact the relative price between the clean and dirty inputs. However, the EU does 
export a significant amount of goods to Switzerland. Table 3.1 shows that Switzerland is the 3
th
 
largest export partner for the EU (First and second are the U.S. and China, which are large 
players in energy markets). Therefore, there may be an observable demand effect from the 
Euro/SFr exchange rate.    
In equation (4), we expect zero substitution effect due to the SFr, but a positive demand 
effect (Euro/SFr ↑ → carbon price ↑).  
(4) 
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3. Data 
 
We use Euro/USD and Euro/SFr exchange rates, European Emission Allowances (EUAs) 
as carbon credit prices, natural gas and coal prices. We use log-transformed price data to see the 
percentage change of the dependent variable for a one percent increase in the independent 
variables. Our data are weekly averages; because energy substitution occurs at a daily frequency 
and weekly average data that encompasses 5 business days can capture daily energy substitution 
as an instantaneous effect from the shocks. Our analysis focuses in the 2
nd
 phase of EU-ETS 
starting from January 2008 to December 2012; we do not include other periods because the 1
st
 
phase of EU-ETS was a test compliance period and the 3
rd
 phase of EU-ETS just began in 2013 
and not enough data exist for a formal analysis.
27
 
We use spot prices of the exchange rates and energy prices to reflect daily cost-
minimizing industrial activities. The currency exchange rates are from European Central Bank 
(ECB). The natural gas price (€/MMBtu) is the Zeebrugge Hub spot price, which is the major 
short-term natural gas trading market in continental Europe. The coal price (€/ton) is the ARA 
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp) spot price, which is the major hub for imported coal in 
northwest Europe.
28
  
The carbon credit prices (€/ton of CO2 or equivalent amount of GHG) are futures prices 
of EUAs with delivery in December of the current calendar year obtained from the 
Intercontinental Exchange. Daily positions in the carbon credit market correspond to firms’ 
expected emission level with their yearly EUA allocation from the government (Reinaud, 2007; 
                                                 
27
 Emission trading schemes are usually divided into a number of "compliance phases" that enforce different levels 
of strictness of the regulatory instruments such as fines and amount of allowances. The 1
st
 phase of EU-ETS was 
from Jan. 2005 to Dec. 2007, the 2
nd
 phase was from Jan. 2008 to Dec. 2012 (coinciding with the EU’s emission 
commitment in the Kyoto protocol), and the 3
rd
 phase is from Jan. 2013 to Dec. 2020. 
28
 See appendix A for the descriptive statistics. 
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Alberola et al, 2008). Penalties are enforced at the end of every year, so although there exists 
EUA futures contracts that expire in March, June, and September these contracts do not 
experience sufficient trading volume to conduct an empirical analysis. Thus, we use the 
December contract of EUA futures prices to construct our series of carbon credit prices; we roll 
from one December contract to the next in the first week of January each year. Because the dates 
on which the data series is rolled from one December contract to the next may experience 
relatively large artificial jumps, we include a dummy variable at the date of each rollover in each 
of the models presented below. If the price differential at the rollover date was too large, the 
dummy variable would be significant in the models and it would indicate that there may be a 
problem using the constructed futures series in our econometric models. However, the dummy 
variable was never significant in any of the models presented below.
29
      
Panel 1 of Figure 3.2 shows recent prices of EUA, natural gas, and coal in Euros. We can 
notice co-movement of coal, natural gas and carbon market. Since higher energy prices represent 
higher energy demand, this also indicates higher carbon dioxide emissions and EUA prices, and 
vice versa. Until mid-2008, there was a general increase in these prices, Then in mid-2008 the 
prices dropped together steeply because of the global recession triggered by the default of 
Goldman Sachs in U.S. Although coal and natural gas prices seem to move together, the price 
spread between them has been diverging since 2008, which affects the relative price between 
coal and natural gas. During the period where coal becomes expensive relative to natural gas, we 
see carbon prices decreasing. Panel 2 of Figure 3.2 shows the trading volume of EUA in a unit of 
1000 metric ton of CO2. 
In the conceptual analysis, we described how the exchange rates influence relative prices 
of energy and influence export demand and how this is transmitted to carbon prices.  In figure 
                                                 
29
 Dummy = 1 at the 1
st
 week of each year, otherwise, dummy = 0. 
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3.3, the Euro appreciates against USD before mid-2008, which corresponds to an increasing 
trend in the energy and carbon prices in panel 1 of figure 3.2. After mid-2008, Goldman Sachs’ 
bankruptcy and the European government’s budget deficit impacted the global financial markets, 
which kept the Euro/USD exchange rate relatively high and unstable. Correspondingly, energy 
markets in panel 1 of figure 3.2 also show a bearish trend compared to the period before mid-
2008. Therefore, we can expect that the recent depreciated Euro against USD as a factor that 
makes coal prices relatively expensive, which induces more consumption of natural gas and 
dampens carbon market through energy markets. On the other hand, the Swiss franc has been 
continuously appreciating against the Euro. 
Table 3.2 shows results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test for stationarity, and we 
conclude that each data series has unit root, I(1). Because all series are integrated of the same 
order, we differenced all variables and test stationary again. Table 3.2 tells us differenced 
variables do not have unit root, but we still need to check cointegration among those non-
stationary variables. We can use a vector error correction model (VECM) if cointegration exists, 
or we can use a differenced vector autoregression (VAR) model if cointegration does not exist.  
In table 3.3, we perform a battery of Johansen trace tests to check for cointegration 
among the 5 variables because they are all I(1) non-stationary series (Johansen and Søren, 1991). 
We could not find cointegration when all 5 variables were included (see table 3.3-1). However, 
previous literature has shown that cointegration is common among energy commodities so we 
test for cointegration between coal and natural gas. We found 1 cointegrating relationship as 
shown in table 3.3-2. Therefore, we use a VECM model with the coefficients on the exchange 
rates and carbon prices in the cointegrating vector restricted to be zero. To implement the 
parameter restrictions we estimated the VECM in two steps. First we regressed the price of coal 
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onto the price of natural gas and obtained residuals from the OLS regression 
(     
                    
    ) . Then the residual term,   , can be used as the error 
correction term in a VECM model. We add this term as an exogenous variable in the VAR model 
to incorporate cointegration. 
We pre-screen for relationships between variables from  bivariate Granger causality tests. 
Bivariate Granger causality shows how past values of one variable affects the other variable.  For 
example, Granger causality between coal and natural gas can be measured from the regression 
with lagged variables in equation (5). 
(5)                                                       
                      
The null hypothesis of Granger causality is              , that is, the change in price of 
natural gas does not granger cause the change in price of coal. Table 3.4 shows p-values of 
Granger causality between each two variables in both directions. The result shows the      
    exchange rate affects the          exchange rate and the price of coal, and the price of 
carbon affects the price of natural gas.  
 
 
4. Model Specification 
 
The structural VAR (SVAR) model is advantagous to characterize exogenous shocks 
based on underlying economic theory and to assess how the shock drives other endogenous 
variables to move together (Breitung, Brüggemann, and Lütkepohl, 2004). Thus, a SVAR model 
is a proper framework to examine the interdependency of exchange rates and other energy 
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markets. We can estimate instantaneous effects from the SVAR model by imposing restrictions 
on the matrix A and B in equation (6) (Amisano and Giannini, 1997; Lütkepohl, 2005), or we 
can put restrictions on the long-run effect (Blanchard and Quah, 1989). In this paper, we use the 
AB model and characterize the instantaneous effect in the matrix A and the recursive structural 
impact from error terms in the B matrix.  
(6)                                       
More explicitly, 
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To assess the interdependencies among exchange rates, energies, and the carbon market 
through structural errors,   , we must assume how the structural shock of each commodity is 
transmitted to other commodities by restricting the matrix B. Choleski decomposition proposed 
by Sims (1980) is used to orthogonalize shocks. This identification is also called Wold causal 
chain that characterizes a sequential causality among variables by ordering them (Wold, 1954). 
Equation (7) shows how the reduced form VAR model can be defined from equation (6) and how 
the structural disturbance,   , can be restricted as a reduced form disturbance,   .  
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(7)      
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In the matrix B, the     terms in matrix represent unrestricted parameters values and 0 
terms to restrict the structural effect of endogenous variable to be zero. For example,   
        
 
and   
        
 are the structural disturbances for the price of coal, which means there exists 
instantaneous response of the price of coal to the shocks of both exchange rates. Thus, 
 (   )
 
         restrictions for the off-diagonal elements of B ensure this structural model to 
be exactly identified. In terms of ordering, exchange rates appear in the first two rows because 
we assume they are endogenous to the other variables of the model. This setup follows Akram 
(2009) since macro variables reflect the overall economy of a certain country so that those would 
work more independently from energy markets and carbon market. Since USD is more dominant 
in world markets than the SFr, we put the Euro/USD before the Euro/SFr. Therefore, the energy 
markets placed in the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 row are subject to the effects of exchange rate shocks. Between 
the coal and natural gas markets in the EU, the coal market has been regarded more susceptible 
to international shocks since the main currency in coal trading is USD, whereas, natural gas 
market is based on the domestic currency, i.e. Euro, and the market might be more isolated from 
currency markets than coal does. The 5
th
 row, the carbon credit market, is the last term after the 
energies since the scale of the energy markets are bigger than the carbon credit market; the price 
transmission from energy to carbon market would be more acceptable than the other way around. 
Hence, the carbon market is the last of the ordering. We will see later in this paper how this 
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different exposure of energy markets to international currency markets affects to the carbon 
credit price determination. 
30
 
In table 3.5, we determine number of lags, J, based on the information criteria such as 
AIC (Akaike 1974), SIC (Schwarz, 1978), and HQIC (Hannan-Quinn, 1979).  Since this paper 
seeks to examine the short-term effect of exchange rate shocks within a couple of months, we 
limit our trial to a maximimum of 5 lags. The AIC recommends 5 lags, the SIC recommends one 
lag, and the HQIC recommends 4 lags. Since the HQIC represents a compromise between the 
parsimony of the SIC and the conservatism of the AIC, we use the HQIC as our decision rule and 
select 4 lags in differenced VAR model. 
After the model is estimated, we apply sequential parameter elimination based on the Top-Down 
procedure with AIC criteria following Lütkepohl’s (2005) sequential elimination of regressors. 
By repeating model estimation, the method sequentially deletes regressors that lead to the largest 
reduction of the AIC until no further reduction is possible (only a single regressor is eliminated 
in each step). Restricting the VAR model with only critical estimated parameters can lead to a 
more reliable impulse response function; in turn this permits a better assessment of the effects of 
shocks to the system. With the regressors that have survived from the sequential elimination 
process, the model is estimated again with only selected regressors. We compute impulse 
responses and forecast error variance decomposition analysis by using the JMulTi software 
package.
31
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 To test the robustness of the model, we will also try other possible structural identifications by imposing different 
ordering among variables based on estimated serial error correlations in section 5(2).    
31
 http://www.jmulti.de/ 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Estimated Model 
 
Parameter estimates of the reduced form VAR are presented in Appendix G. The 
estimated coefficients can be interpreted as price elasticities because we use log-transformed 
data.After estimating the reduced form VAR model, we can try misspecification (diagnostic) 
tests to verify the robustness of the result of our model. In Appendix H, we do not find 
autocorrelation from Portmanteau test but find an evidence of autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH) in exchange rates and coal prices and non-normality for all data 
series. Based on the diagnostic test results, there is no bias on the linear dependencies of energy 
and carbon markets on exchange rates (Lütkepohl, 2005), but statistic significance of the results 
might be over or underestimated.  
From the estimates of matrix A and B, table 3.6 shows how much the structural effect in 
SVAR model would be delivered.
32
    
(8)      
      
In column one we can see that 1% decrease in the Euro (a positive shock in Euro/USD 
exchange rate) will increases the price of coal about 0.61% and decreases the price of carbon 
credits about 0.51%. The simultaneous effect of Euro/USD on natural gas is not significant. This 
is consistent with our hypothesis in the conceptual analysis that the Euro/USD exchange rate 
would positively affect the price of coal and negatively affect the price of carbon, but have no 
effect on the price of natural gas. Comparatively, in column two we see that the Euro/SFr has no 
                                                 
32
 From the relationship between the reduced form disturbance and the structural disturbance in equation (8), 
estimates of      represent the effect of one standard deviation of the independent variable on the percentage 
change in the dependent variable. 
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statistically significant effect in natural gas and carbon, and the magnitude on coal is small.  In 
row four we do see that a 1% increase in the price of natural gas increases the price of carbon 
about 0.55%, which also corresponds to our conceptual framework.  
 
5.2   Impulse response function 
 
In this section, we run impulse response functions based on the previously described 
differenced SVAR model to compliment what we discussed in table 3.6. We estimated 95% 
confidence intervals with respect to the impulse response to one standard deviation shock by 
bootstrapping 1500 iterations, as suggested by Hall (1992), to obtain a more reliable confidence 
interval. The impulse response which describes effects of a Euro/USD exchange rate shock on 
the energy and carbon markets appears in panels 1 and 2 in figure 3.4.  Both panels illustrate the 
effect of energy substitution; panel 1 shows the marginal impulse response and panel 2 shows the 
accumulative response.  
The first row of panel 1 and 2 in figure 3.4 depicts the coal market: one standard 
deviation from a depreciated Euro against the USD leads to approximately a 6% initial increase 
in the coal price, which is statistically significant. This is in accordance to our expectations since 
a positive shock to the Euro/USD exchange rate increases the coal price in Euros, even if the 
price in the USD is unchanged. Panel 1 shows the positive marginal positive effect and panel 2 
shows that a statistically significant accumulative effect lasts for at least one week.  
The second rows of panel 1 and 2 in figure 3.4 depict the natural gas market showing 
statistically insignificant results. There is no immediate response from the Euro/USD exchange 
rate shock, and the accumulative effect is also not significantly different from the mean of 0. 
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This is also consistent with our expectations because the European natural gas market is not 
exposed to the Euro/USD exchange rate risk.  
The third row of panel 1 and 2 in figure 3.4 depicts the carbon market: one standard 
deviation from a depreciated Euro against the USD lowers the carbon credit price by 5%. Panel 1 
shows the marginal negative effect and panel 2 confirms that the negative accumulative effects 
also persist. This occurs due to the energy substitution effect resulting from relative energy price 
changes. A depreciated Euro increases the price of coal relative to natural gas, which induces 
less consumption of coal. Since natural gas is a less carbon-intensive fossil fuel than is the case 
for coal, the depreciated Euro against USD lowers both the demand for GHG emissions and the 
demand for emission credits.  
 As discussed in conceptual analysis, the Euro/USD exchange rate has both an energy 
substitution effect and demand effect, but the effects are expected to have opposite signs: a 
negative substitution effect and a positive demand effect. Thus, we conclude that the energy 
substitution effect dominates the demand effect, and that it is possible that the substitution effect 
is larger than is reflected by this estimate.            
Figure 3.5 depicts the demand effect through a shock to Euro/SFr. We contrast these 
results with that of the Euro/USD because the Euro/USD is expected to have both an energy 
substitution effect and a demand effect from Euro/USD, while the Euro/SFr should only have a 
demand effect on carbon prices. Panel 1 in figure 3.5 shows the marginal impulse response of 
coal, natural gas, and carbon market to a shock of one positive standard deviation of exchange 
rate (depreciated Euro against SFr), and panel 2 in figure 3.5  shows the accumulative response, 
respectively.      
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There is no statistically significant effect of the Euro/SFr exchange rate shock on any of 
the prices. Even the marginal effects shown in panel 1 of figure 3.5 are not statistically different 
from mean 0. Despite our hypothesis about the role of exchange rates on the consumption of 
exports, we do not find evidence that this has a significant impact on the carbon market. 
Therefore, we conclude that the European carbon market is affected by the Euro/USD exchange 
rate by the energy substitution mechanism at least, but we cannot separately identify any demand 
effect.  
Figure 3.6 examines the interactions among coal, natural gas and the carbon market. The 
substitution effect from the relative price difference between coal and natural gas has been 
regarded as the main price driver of carbon pricing. If the price of a dirty input such as coal 
increases due to depreciated Euros, it would decrease the consumption of coal but will increase 
the consumption of natural gas instead because natural gas becomes “relatively” cheap. Likewise, 
if the price of a clean input such as natural gas increases due to an appreciated Euro, coal would 
be consumed more than natural gas. The amount of GHG emissions depends on readjustment of 
the consumption between dirty and clean inputs, which affect the direction that carbon prices 
move. Kanen (2006) and Alberola et al (2008) find that carbon prices are more sensitive to 
natural gas price changes than to coal prices changes. Our results in figure 3.6 also support their 
findings. Panel 1 in figure 3.6 shows the marginal impulse responses and panel 2 in figure 3.6 
shows the accumulative effects in a comparative manner.  
The first columns of both panels in figure 3.6 show the effect of coal price shock and 
subsequent responses of the natural gas market and the carbon market. A shock of one positive 
standard deviation of the coal price leads to an initial increase in the natural gas price, which can 
be explained by highly correlated energy prices. However, the response of the carbon credit price 
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is not significantly different from 0. This means that an increased amount of emissions from 
burning more natural gas is not smaller than a decreased amount of emissions from a coal price 
increase. 
 The second columns of both panels depict the effect of a natural gas price shock. A 
change in natural gas prices also shows positive relation with coal. However, unlike the 
insignificant effect of the coal price shock on carbon price, a price shock in natural gas generates 
a response in carbon credit prices that is significantly different than zero, which correspond to 
Kanen (2006) and Alberola et al (2008). This is because a price increase in natural gas makes 
energy users substitute coal for natural gas, which triggers more emission needs and increases 
the carbon price.    
The third column shows the effect of the carbon market on the other energy markets. One 
positive standard deviation in the carbon price does not result in a significant price change in 
coal, but leads to a significant price increase for natural gas. High carbon prices mean high 
compliance costs for GHG emissions, and energy users would use a clean input such as natural 
gas. More demand for less carbon-intensive input will decrease prices of natural gas.  
In addition, observing the error correlation matrix in table 3.7, overall correlations are not 
quite high so that we expect restrictions on matrix B may not cause substantial change of the 
result. However, we can see the cross-correlation between Euro/USD and Euro/SFr residuals and 
the cross-correlation between Euro/USD and Coal residuals are comparatively high. Also, there 
are some correlation between Euro/USD and carbon, and between Natural gas and Carbon. Thus, 
we consider these interactions when we construct the restrictions of B matrix. For example, by 
switching the order of matrix B, we can understand whether the relatively high correlation 
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between Euro/USD and Coal is caused mainly from the effect of Euro/USD on Coal or vice 
versa.   
Thus, we tried other structural restrictions on the B matrix based on the estimated serial 
error correlations in table 3.7 to see the robustness of the model. We reversed 1) the order 
between Euro/USD and Euro/SFr, 2) the order between Euro/USD and Coal, 3) the order 
between Euro/USD and Carbon, and 4) the order between Carbon and Natural gas. The results 
are as follows.
33
 
1) No significant change in the result. 
2) The effect Euro/USD on coal becomes negative. 
3) No significant relationship between the Euro/USD and carbon in both ways. 
4) Less significant effect of natural gas on carbon and more significant effect of carbon on 
natural gas; this is expectable from the new ordering.  
These results are consistent with the result of the original ordering restriction of Choleski 
decomposition because the effect of Euro/USD on carbon via energy substitution is still valid.  
 
5.3   Forecast error variance decomposition of shocks 
 
Figure 3.7 decomposes the contribution of different structural shocks to price fluctuations 
over the course of 20 weeks. The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) displays the 
percentile contribution of four different sources of shocks: exchange rates, coal prices, natural 
gas prices and carbon prices. Each row shows the coal, natural gas and carbon market, 
respectively.  
                                                 
33
 Results about impulse responses are available upon request. 
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The FEVD generally confirms the causality result obtained from the IRF analysis. The 
Euro/USD exchange rate has the highest explanatory power regarding the price of coal, the 
second highest explanatory power regarding the price of carbon credits, and almost negligible 
explanatory power regarding the price of natural gas. This is because the price of coal is 
converted from USDs to Euro when purchased from the international coal market. Thus the 
nominal coal price in Euros is directly affected by the Euro/USD exchange rate. In the case of 
the carbon market, the Euro/USD exchange rate indirectly affects carbon prices via the coal 
market because the price spread between coal and natural gas affects the carbon price. On the 
other hand, European natural gas market is unglued from the international energy market so the 
exchange rate has little impact on natural gas prices. 
With regard to interactions between the carbon market and the different types of energy, 
the FEVD results remain consistent with the IRF, which demonstrates the energy substitution 
effect and the positive correlation between substitutable energies. These results allow us to 
ascertain that coal is more relatively exogenous than natural gas and carbon credits, and about 20% 
of the forecast error in natural gas is explained by coal. On the other hand, carbon credit is the 
most endogenous variable in the sense that it is explained by all of the other variables. Natural 
gas explains about 25% of the forecast error in carbon credit as the most important price driver.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper discusses the link between carbon pricing and exchange rates. Our paper 
verifies that depreciated (appreciated) local currencies can cause low (high) carbon prices 
through the energy substitution mechanism. The exchange rate shock on the carbon market is 
due to non-homogeneous effects on energy markets. Our empirical analysis shows that the 
depreciation in Euros leads to a price increase in coal, a neutral price change for natural gas, and 
a price decrease for carbon credits. This occurs because all three commodities have different 
degrees of exposure to exchange rate risks. Coal is traded in USDs, natural gas is imported 
mainly from Russia and contracted in Euros, and carbon prices have been determined by the 
price spread between coal and natural gas. Then, the substitutability between coal and natural gas 
serves as the key component that determines the carbon price in an asymmetric manner.  
If the European debt crisis persists and the contagion spreads to other European countries, 
we can expect the Euro currency to become weaker. This makes it more probable that the spread 
between coal and natural gas in the European market will increase, and this makes industries 
prefer natural gas to coal along with their demand for GHG emissions. If exchange rates increase 
due to the potential risk of individual firms’ bankruptcies or moratoriums of European countries, 
then this may magnify the slump of carbon markets. Also, monetary easing of Euro will cause 
similar problem. In conclusion, the carbon market may show bearish movements because of the 
effect of depreciated Euro although energy markets are recovering. This may be an explanation 
of the de-trending of carbon markets away from energy markets.  
Furthermore, our results can be generalized to other countries for whom a dirty input is 
denominated in a foreign currency and a clean input is denominated in the domestic currency.  
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Additionally, we can obtain similar results when the clean input is denominated in a foreign 
currency and the dirty input is denominated in the local currency. The direction of exchange rate 
exposure would change so that a depreciating domestic currency has a positive energy 
substitution effect on carbon credit prices. Such types of energy dependency in international 
markets characterize the role of exchange rates on the carbon market. For a country like U.S. that 
uses the same currency for domestic and international purpose, or like Australia that is almost 
self-sufficient in energy, the effect of exchange rates on their carbon markets would be negligible.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Long-run Policy Locus (  is the inter-temporal permit trading ratio) 
 
Panel 1 
  
 
Panel 2 
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Figure 1.2: Choice of short-run optimal policy 
 
 
Panel 1 
 
 
Panel 2 
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Figure 2.1. 
 
Source: World Bank, 2009 (Spot EUA and sCER: Bluenext; average primary CER price for categories b and 
c: IDEA Carbon)
34
 
  
                                                 
34
 The primary CER is categorized in three groups: “Category A”: negotiating terms, “Category B”: in exclusive 
negotiations, “Category C”: contracted. Category A is usually not cited as the primary CER index because it is in too 
early stages to be informative figures for delivery projections. 
(http://www.tradingemissionsplc.com/Report2008/investment_advisers.swf). 
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Figure 2.2 : Optimal equilibrium of abatement and offset credits  
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Figure 2.3 : Price equilibrium trajectory when the offset credit import limit changes. 
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Figure 2.4: Price equilibrium trajectory when the market conditions change 
 
Panel 1) Effect of abatement cost shock  Panel 2) Effect of offset project cost shock  
  
Panel 3) Effect of penalty change or 
uncertainty in emissions 
Panel 4) Effect of free endowment of 
allowances 
  
  * Dotted line (after the change), solid line (before the change) 
** Note that all the graphics in figure 4 reflex the effect of more than a 50% change in each parameter to 
show the effect more vividly.  
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Figure 2.5 : Persistent Price Spread 
Panel 1) Effect of the import limit on the spread  
 
 
Panel 2) Effect of uncertainties on offset credits 
 
  
   
82 
 
Figure 2.6: Asymmetric Market Interaction 
 
Panel 1) Effect of abatement cost shock (correspond to the panel 1 of figure 4) 
 
Panel 2) Effect of offset project cost shock (correspond to the panel 2 of figure 4) 
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Figure 2.6 (cont.) 
 
Panel 3) Effect of penalty change or uncertainty in emissions (correspond to the panel 3 of figure 4) 
 
Panel 4) Effect of free endowment of allowances (correspond to the panel 4 of figure 4) 
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Figure 3.1. Conceptual analysis (when Euro is depreciated against USD) 
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Figure 3.2.  Market Data 
Panel 1)  Nominal prices of coal, natural gas and carbon credit prices in Euro 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
 
Panel 2)  Trading Volume of carbon credits 
 
Source: Bloomberg  
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Figure 3.3. Exchange rates  
 
Source: Bloomberg  
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Figure 3.4. Impulse to Euro/USD exchange rate 
Panel 1. Impulse to Euro/USD exchange rate; response to coal (1
st
 row), natural gas (2
nd
 
row), and carbon credit (3
rd
 row). 
Panel 2. Accumulative impulse to Euro/USD exchange rate; response to coal (1
st
 row), 
natural gas (2
nd
 row), and carbon credit (3
rd
 row).  
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Figure 3.5. Impulse to Euro/SFr exchange rate 
 
Panel 1. Impulse to Euro/SFr exchange rate; response of coal (1
st
 row), natural gas (2
nd
 row), and 
carbon credit (3
rd
 row) 
 
Panel 2. Accumulative Euro/SFr impulse to exchange rate; response of coal (1
st
 row), natural gas 
(2
nd
 row), and carbon credit (3
rd
 row)  
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Figure 3.6. Interactions among energies and carbon market 
 
 
Panel 1. Impulse to coal (1
st
 column), natural gas (2
nd
 column) and carbon credit (3
rd
 column); 
response of coal (1
st
 row), natural gas (2
nd
 row) and carbon credit (3
rd
 row) 
 
Panel 2. Accumulative Impulse to coal (1
st
 column), natural gas (2
nd
 column) and carbon credit 
(3
rd
 column); response of coal (1
st
 row), natural gas (2
nd
 row) and carbon credit (3
rd
 row) 
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Figure 3.7. FEVD based on SVAR model with coal (1
st
 row), natural gas (2
nd
 row) and carbon 
(3
rd
 row). 
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Tables 
 
Table 1.1: Parameters chosen to plot of analytical solution of optimal abatement 
Parameters Values 
Natural decaying rate,  α 0.8 
Marginal abatement cost per ton of emission,  c 0.005 
Monetization parameter,     0.2 
Discount factor,  β 0.8 
Stochastic emission upper limit,    ̅ 24,000 
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Table 2.1: Parameter Assumptions 
 Parameters Values* 
Supply side Cost coefficient for Abatement,    c 0.004 
Cost coefficient for offset project,   k 0.002 
Demand side Penalty rate,            70 
Uncertain emission upper limit,     ̅ 13,000 
Free endowment of allowances,    L 6,000 
 
* Parameters are chosen from the stylized fact of European carbon market. We choose the cost coefficients that 
roughly illustrate current spot EUA / CER prices at the current import limit (13.4% of total EUA). The upper 
limit of emissions is assumed to let its average be slightly higher than the amount of EUA endowment to 
encourage abatement.   
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Table 2.2: Sensitivity Analysis (% change) 
 Parameters                      threshold 
Supply 
side 
Cost coefficient for Abatement,    c +10% +4.80 % +0.56 % +2.61 % 
-10% -4.59 % -0.66 % -3.09 % 
Cost coefficient for offset project,   k +10% +0.05 % +7.84 % -6.43 % 
-10% -0.05 % -8.63 % +6.87 % 
Demand 
side 
Penalty rate,            +10% +4.80 % +0.77 % +3.23 % 
-10% -5.88 % -0.88 % -3.81 % 
Uncertain emission upper limit,     ̅ +10% +12.52 % +1.85 % +12.65 % 
-10% -16.00 % -2.40 % -15.57 % 
Free endowment of allowances,    L +10% -12.01 % +6.37 % -20.31 % 
-10% +10.76 % -7.32 % +20.63 % 
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Table 3.1. Bilateral Trading Relations with EU (last update 12/01/2012) 
 
Rank Import from % Rank Export to % Rank Total % 
1 China 17.3 1 USA 17.0 1 USA 13.8 
2 Russia 11.8 2 China 8.9 2 China 13.3 
3 USA 10.9 3 Switzerland 7.9 3 Russia 9.5 
4 Norway 5.5 4 Russia 7.1 4 Switzerland 6.6 
5 Switzerland 5.4 5 Turkey 4.7 5 Norway 4.4 
6 Japan 4.0 6 Japan 3.2 6 Turkey 3.7 
7 Turkey 2.8 7 Norway 3.0 7 Japan 3.6 
8 India 2.3 8 India 2.6 8 India 2.5 
9 Brazil 2.2 9 Brazil 2.3 9 Brazil 2.3 
10 S.Korea 2.1 10 U.A.Emirates 2.1 10 S.Korea 2.1 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/ 
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Table 3.2. Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test  
 
 Model Lags 5% statistics Result 
Carbon NCNT 7 -1.94 -1.57 Non-stationary 
Coal NCNT 1 -1.94 -0.35 Non-stationary 
Natural gas CNT 9 -2.86 -2.08 Non-stationary 
Euro/USD CNT 0 -2.86 -2.11 Non-stationary 
Euro/SFr CT 8 -3.41 -2.26 Non-stationary 
d. Carbon NCNT 0 -1.94 -6.31 Stationary 
d. Coal NCNT 0 -1.94 -13.50 Stationary 
d. Natural gas NCNT 0 -1.94 -4.22 Stationary 
d. Euro/USD NCNT 0 -1.94 -15.17 Stationary 
d. Euro/SFr CNT 5 -2.86 -9.08 Stationary 
CT: constant and trend, CNT: constant and no trend, NCNT: no constant and no trend. 
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Table 3.3. Johansen trace test 
 
Table 3.3-1: Cointegration for all variables 
Rank Trace statistic 5% critical Value P-value 
0* 51.86 76.81 0.7977 
1 32.88 53.94 0.8144 
2 19.30 35.07 0.7673 
3 8.28 35.07 0.7991 
4 2.65 9.14 0.6532 
 
 
Table 3.3-2: Cointegration for Coal and Natural Gas 
Rank Trace statistic 5% critical Value P-value 
0 25.51 20.16 0.0073 
1* 2.82 9.14 0.2093 
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Table 3.4. Granger causality test result 
 
effect 
cause 
                                               
           0.0635* 0.001*** 0.2562 0.6719 
          0.1036  0.1033 0.1249 0.1033 
      0.7271 0.4324  0.0029 0.6753 
             0.2814 0.4413 0.6700  0.6632 
        0.6004 0.8094 0.9537 0.0540*  
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Table 3.5. Determining the number of lags  
# of lags of endogenous various AIC SIC HQIC 
5 -9.071854e+00* -8.496865e+00 -8.840254e+00 
4 -9.011207e+00 -8.638558e+00 -8.861125e+00* 
3 -8.981066e+00 -8.652377e+00 -8.848703e+00 
2 -8.940307e+00 -8.711654e+00 -8.848229e+00 
1 -8.871413e+00 -8.714214e+00* -8.808109e+00 
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Table 3.6: Estimated effect of structural shock from the matrix (    ): estimate (p-value) 
 
Disturbance 
term    
Dependent 
Euro/USD t Euro/SFr t Coal t Natural gas t Carbon t 
Euro/USD t 0.0069 
(0.000)  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Euro/SFr t 0.0016 
(0.000) 
0.0050 
(0.000)  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Coal t 0.0061 
(0.000) 
-0.0016 
(0.045) 
0.0132 
(0.000)  
0.0000 0.0000 
Natural gas t -0.0009 
(0.490)  
0.0003 
(0.818)  
-0.0001 
(0.441) 
0.0201 
(0.000)   
0.0000 
Carbon t -0.0051 
(0.001)  
-0.0019 
(0.204) 
0.0005 
(0.734) 
0.0055 
(0.001)  
0.0238 
(0.000)   
* We can find significances from the effect of Euro/USD on coal and carbon and the effect of 
natural gas on carbon.  
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Table 3.7: Error Correlation 
 
 Euro/USD Euro/SFr Coal Natural gas Carbon 
Euro/USD 1 - - - - 
Euro/SFr 0.310 1 - - - 
Coal 0.420 0.020 1 - - 
Natural gas -0.055 0.001 0.007 1 - 
Carbon -0.198 -0.137 -0.0510 0.235 1 
* Overall correlations are not quite high so that we expect restrictions, but we can see the cross-
correlation between Euro/USD and Euro/SFr residuals and the cross-correlation between 
Euro/USD and Coal residuals are comparatively high. 
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Appendix A: Solving the Value Function of the Regulator 
 
With the assumptions that simplify algebraic expressions (quadratic abatement and 
environmental damage function, and uniform p.d.f of emissions), we can describe the optimal 
policy path in a form of Euler equation. 
(A-1)      [ (     )       ] 
Because    [
           
   
] and E(Y)= 
 ̅
 
 under the uniform distribution assumption, 
(A-2)    [(
  
  
 
 
)   
 
 
(  
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With an assumption that the abatement is the function of emission stock, 
(A-3)                 [ (     
 )      ]   (     {  
 ̅
 
 
 })         (     {  
 ̅
 
 (     )})       
(       
 ̅
 
        )  (         
   )  
Here, from the law of motion, equation (4), the stock of banked permit    is replaced by the 
expected value of   , that is,  (  )   ( (     ))   (  
 ̅
 
  ) ; since X is the state 
variable, and u is decided before the realization of stochastic emission y.  
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Below are the codes used to solve the dynamic programming problem by comparing coefficient 
of (A-3). We start solving from the assumption that optimal abatement function has linear 
functional form. Since equation (A-3) must have positive slope, we choose   with positive value. 
Thereby, the closed form of optimal abatement function is as below. 
 
(A-4)          
         √      (       ) 
    
     
 ̅(                     √      (       )     √      (       ) )
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Appendix B : Solving the Value Function of Private Firm 
 
 Under the assumption of quadratic marginal abatement cost, the Euler equation from equation 
(20) is defined as 
(B-1)      ∫  ( )  
 
     
        
From the uniform distribution of y, ∫  ( )  
 
     
 
 
 ̅
( ̅       ), the Euler equation of 
(B-1) becomes (B-2) 
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)   
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With an assumption that the abatement is the function of emission stock, 
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 )      ] = (    {    
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Below are the codes used to solve the dynamic programming problem by comparing coefficient 
of (B-3). We start solving from the assumption that optimal abatement function has linear 
functional form. Since equation (B-3) must have negative slope, we choose   with positive 
value. Thereby, the closed form of optimal abatement function is as below. 
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Appendix C: Comparative Statics  
 
From the first order conditions in equation (8) and (9), the interior solution (     ) is defined as 
below: 
(C-1) 
    ( )
  
 
               [         [     ]     ]
  
   
(C-2)  
  ( )
  
 
               [         [     ]     ]
  
   
The equation (A-1) implicitly defines   (        | ̅)  
 ( | ̅)   ( | ̅)   ( | ̅) , and the 
equation (A-2) implicitly defines   (        | ̅)  
 ( | ̅)   ( | ̅)   ( | ̅), where the symbol  
  refers that other parameters are status quo in equation. 
Regarding the effect of         , redefine (A-1) and (A-2) as 
(C-3) 
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To see how          aﬀects the equilibria, we totally diﬀerentiate equation (A-1) and (A-2), 
{
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Since the objective function is a convex function with respect to (   ) as a cost-minimizing 
objective function, the denominators of 
   (        | ̅)
         
 and 
   (        | ̅)
         
 are positive; whereas, 
the nominators are negative. 
Thus, we can conclude that 
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Regarding the effect of  , redefine (A-1) and (A-2) as 
(C-5) 
    (  ( | ̅))
   ( | ̅)
 
               [     
 ( | ̅)    [     ]     ]
   ( | ̅)
   
(C-6)  
  (  ( | ̅))
   ( | ̅)
 
               [         [ 
 ( | ̅)    ]     ]
   ( | ̅)
   
   
107 
 
To see how   aﬀects the equilibria, we totally diﬀerentiate equation (A-1) and (A-2). 
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Since the objective function is a convex function with respect to (   ) as a cost-minimizing 
objective function, the denominators of 
   ( | ̅)
  
 and 
   ( | ̅)
  
 are positive; whereas, the 
nominators are negative. 
Thus, we can conclude that 
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Regarding the effect of  , redefine (A-1) and (A-2) as 
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To see how   aﬀects the equilibria, we totally diﬀerentiate equation (A-1) and (A-2). 
{
     (  ( | ̅))
   ( | ̅)
  
                [     
 ( | ̅)    [     ]     ]
   ( | ̅)
 }   ( | ̅)  
{
                [     
 ( | ̅)    [     ]     ]
   ( | ̅)  
}       
 
   ( | ̅)
  
  
{
               [     
 ( | ̅)    [     ]     ]
    
}
{
     (  ( | ̅))
   ( | ̅) 
 
               [     
 ( | ̅)    [     ]     ]
   ( | ̅) 
}
  
And, 
{
   (  ( | ̅))
   ( | ̅)
  
                [         [ 
 ( | ̅)    ]     ]
   ( | ̅)
 }   ( | ̅)  
{
               [         [ 
 ( | ̅)    ]     ]
   ( | ̅)  
}       
 
 
   ( | ̅)
  
  
{
               [         [ 
 ( | ̅)    ]     ]
   ( | ̅)  
}
{
   (  ( | ̅))
   ( | ̅) 
 
               [         [ 
 ( | ̅)    ]     ]
   ( | ̅) 
}
  
 
Since the objective function is a convex function with respect to (   ) as a cost-minimizing 
objective function, the denominators of 
   ( | ̅)
  
 and 
   ( | ̅)
  
 are positive. Contrary to previous 
cases, the nominator of 
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 is positive, whereas, the nominator of 
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 is negative. 
Thus, we can derive different directions that 
   ( | ̅)
  
    and  
   ( | ̅)
  
  . 
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Regarding the effect of  , redefine (A-1) and (A-2) as 
(C-9) 
    (  ( | ̅))
   ( | ̅)
 
               [     
 ( | ̅)    [     ]     ]
   ( | ̅)
   
(C-10)  
  (  ( | ̅))
   ( | ̅)
 
               [         [ 
 ( | ̅)    ]     ]
   ( | ̅)
   
To see how   aﬀects the equilibria, we totally diﬀerentiate equation (A-1) and (A-2), 
{
     ( )
   ( | ̅)
  
                [     
 ( | ̅)    [     ]     ]
   ( | ̅)
 }    ( | ̅)  
{
                [     
 ( | ̅)    [     ]     ]
   ( | ̅)  
}       
 
   ( | ̅)
  
  
{
               [     
 ( | ̅)    [     ]     ]
   ( | ̅)  
}
{
     (  ( | ̅))
   ( | ̅) 
 
               [     
 ( | ̅)    [     ]     ]
   ( | ̅) 
}
  
And, 
{
   (  ( | ̅))
   ( | ̅)
  
                [         [ 
 ( | ̅)    ]     ]
   ( | ̅)
 }   ( | ̅)  
{
               [         [ 
 ( | ̅)    ]     ]
   ( | ̅)  
}       
 
 
   ( | ̅)
  
  
{
               [         [ 
 ( | ̅)    ]     ]
   ( | ̅)  
}
{
   (  ( | ̅))
   ( | ̅) 
 
               [         [ 
 ( | ̅)    ]     ]
   ( | ̅) 
}
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Since the objective function is a convex function with respect to (   ) as a cost-minimizing 
objective function, the denominators of 
   ( | ̅)
  
 and 
   ( | ̅)
  
 are positive. Contrary to previous 
cases, the nominator of 
   ( | ̅)
  
 is positive, whereas, the nominator of 
   ( | ̅)
  
 is negative. 
Thus, we can derive different directions that 
   ( | ̅)
  
    and  
   ( | ̅)
  
  . 
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Appendix D: Beta Probability Density Function  
 
Probability Density function of baseline emissions (y) 
 
 
Probability Density function of the CER default factor ( )   
 
  
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
y: Emission
0.5
1.0
1.5
Probability Density
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
: Discount rate
1
2
3
4
5
Probability Density
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Appendix E: Closed form solution of equilibrium  
 
The equations below describe the closed form solutions of the price of allowances and offset 
credits. 
 
                [
 (    ̅)(        ̅)
          ̅        ̅        ̅ 
 
 
       
(               ̅          
     ̅[          
 (        ̅           ̅                     ̅  )
 (      ̅        ̅ )]
 
 ] 
 
             [ 
     (   ̅) ̅
          ̅        ̅        ̅ 
 [          
 (        ̅           ̅                     ̅  )
 (      ̅        ̅ )]
 
 ] 
 
  
   
113 
 
Appendix F: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 EU/USD  EU/SFr Coal Natural gas Carbon 
Mean 0.72 0.68 96.46 48.23 18.06 
Median 0.72 0.66 93.75 46.60 16.03 
Maximum 0.84 0.91 192.50 95.00 31.42 
Minimum 0.63 0.60 51.60 17.40 9.43 
Std. Dev 0.04 0.07 30.35 16.15 4.98 
Skewness -0.02 1.00 0.61 0.62 0.79 
Kurtosis -0.43 0.16 -0.11 0.01 -0.46 
Observation 249 249 249 249 249 
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Appendix G: Estimated reduced VAR model: estimate {p-value} 
 
 Euro/USD t Euro/SFr t Coal t Natural gas t Carbon t 
Euro/USD t-1   
 
-0.775 
{0.000} 
 
 
-0.350 
{0.122} 
Euro/USD t-2 0.049 
{0.386} 
-0.105 
{0.023} 
 -0.294 
{0.089} 
 
 
Euro/USD t-3  
 
0.106 
{0.020} 
   
Euro/USD t-4  
 
    
Euro/SFr t-1  -0.140 
{0.015} 
  0.539 
{0.066} 
Euro/SFr t-2 -0.194 
{0.014} 
 -0.323 
{0.056} 
 0.298 
{0.297} 
Euro/SFr t-3  0.116 
{0.050} 
 -0.586 
{0.011} 
-0.584 
{0.041} 
Euro/SFr t-4  
 
    
Coal t-1   0.316 
{0.001} 
  
Coal t-2      
 
Coal t-3  
 
  0.100 
{0.203} 
 
Coal t-4 -0.039 
{0.085} 
  0.149 
{0.058} 
 
Natural gas t-1 0.035 
{0.036} 
  0.114 
{0.049} 
 
Natural gas t-2    0.109 
{0.062} 
0.113 
{0.103} 
Natural gas t-3  0.031 
{0.030} 
   
Natural gas t-4  
 
    
Carbon t-1   
 
  -0.102 
{0.087} 
Carbon t-2    
 
  
Carbon t-3  
 
    
Carbon t-4  
 
  0.118 
{0.016} 
-0.121 
{0.042} 
Dummy t * 0.009 
{0.011} 
 0.012 
{0.108} 
 -0.019 
{0.120} 
Dummy t-1 
 
     
Dummy t-2 
 
Dummy t-3 
 
  -0.026 
{0.000} 
  
Dummy t-4 
 
   0.022 
{0.024} 
 
Error Correction 
Term t-1 
   -0.032 
{0.014} 
-0.035 
{0.021} 
Constant      
* A dummy variable represents the date of rollover in December contract of EUA futures prices 
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Appendix H: Diagnostic test results 
 
 
As diagnostic tests of residuals (Euro/USD,   ; Euro/SFr,     Coal,   ; Natural gas   ; Carbon, 
  ) we perform Jarque-Bera tests to check normality, ARCH-LM for heteroscedasticity, and the 
Portmanteau test for autocorrelation. 
 
Autocorrelation 
PORTMANTEAU TEST (H0:no autocorrelation) 
Reference: Lütkepohl (1993), Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis, 2ed, p. 150. 
tested order:             16  
test statistic:           367.2815 
 p-value:                 0.5593   
adjusted test statistic:  381.6406 
 p-value:                 0.3539   
degrees of freedom:       372.0000 
 
Non-Normality 
JARQUE-BERA TEST 
variable        teststat   p-Value(Chi^2)   
u1              48.3174    0.0000           
u2              345.9179   0.0000             
u3              12.0129   0.0000              
u4              2417.8731 0.0000           
u5              53.0720    0.0000             
 
 
ARCH Effect 
Univariate ARCH-LM TEST with 16 lags (H0: no arch error) 
variable        teststat   p-Value(Chi^2) 
u1              34.3026    0.0049              
u2              50.4150    0.0000              
u3              44.8119    0.0001              
u4              2.5310     0.9999              
u5              20.5104    0.1981             
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Residual series (std deviation) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
